Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists: Presidential Power and Fourth
Amendment Limits
by Richard Henry Seamon*
This article examines the recently disclosed, presidentially authorized program of warrantless
electronic surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA). Critics of the program say it
violates the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and the Fourth Amendment.
Supporters counter that it falls within the President's congressionally irreducible power to protect
national security and within the relaxed Fourth Amendment governing national security
searches. This article focuses on an aspect of the controversy to which neither critics nor
supporters have paid much attention: the connection between the issues of whether the NSA
program violates FISA and whether it violates the Fourth Amendment. The article concludes
that the President can authorize surveillance that violates FISA when such surveillance "outside
FISA" is reasonably necessary to respond to a genuine national security emergency. That
same emergency will ordinarily bring the surveillance within the exigent circumstances doctrine
of the Fourth Amendment, as modified by the special needs doctrine. This overlap between
presidential power to ignore an Act of Congress and to act free of traditional Fourth Amendment
constraints is not mere coincidence. Both the separation of powers doctrine and Fourth
Amendment doctrine limit executive power but carve out an area in which the President may act
free of ordinary constraints when necessary to protect the nation. It is hoped that the analysis
underlying this conclusion is more nuanced (and stakes out a more moderate position) than that
offered by most critics and supporters of the NSA program. The analysis may, therefore, supply
a legal foundation for principled and politically feasible legislative reform. In any event, the
analysis offered here also informs the broad, ongoing debate over the proper roles of Congress
and the federal courts in enforcing the Fourth Amendment.
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Introduction
The President has been spying on Americans again.1 The current domestic spying

program began right after 9/11 and is conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) for the
1

Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Congressional Research Service, Presidential Authority to
Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information (Jan. 5, 2006), at
1-2 [hereinafter CRS Report on Warrantless Surveillance], available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on
Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. This is not the first time that a U.S. President
has used electronic surveillance to spy on Americans supposedly for national security reasons. Indeed,
the practice goes back at least to Franklin D. Roosevelt, as the Church Committee disclosed in the
1970s. The Church Committee's revelations led to enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, which is at the center of the current controversy. See Margaret Ebrahim, Warrantless Surveillance
Debated during Ford Term: The Dispute Was Similar to the Current One Between Congress and the
White House, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 4, 2006, at A10, 2006 WLNR 2001538 (reporting that 200 pages of
historic records "reflect a remarkably similar dispute between the White House and Congress fully three
decades before President Bush's acknowledgement [in December 2005] that he authorized wiretaps
without warrants of some Americans in terrorism investigations"); Scott Shane, For Some, Spying
Controversy Recalls a Past Drama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at A18 (comparing post 9/11 domestic
surveillance program to surveillance programs that came to light in the 1970s and that led to legislative
reform); Karen Dorn Steele, Yakima's Spy Outpost: Secrecy Shrouds NSA Installation Monitoring West
Coast, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane, WA), Feb. 5, 2006, at 1A ("The current NSA controversy is a
flashback to the 1960s and '70s, when NSA, the CIA and the FBI were caught illegally spying on
journalists, congressmen, and peace activists.").
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purpose of detecting and preventing eventuation of threats posed by international terrorists.2
The NSA program has been thought to raise two issues.3 One issue is whether the program
violates the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).4 This FISA issue arises
because the NSA program involves electronic surveillance (e.g., wiretapping) that is subject to
FISA but has occurred without FISA compliance. The second issue is whether the program
violates the Fourth Amendment.5 This Fourth Amendment issue arises because surveillance
under the NSA program occurs without prior judicial authorization or traditional probable cause.6
Public debate on the surveillance program is correct to distinguish the FISA issue from the
Fourth Amendment issue; they require different analyses. Public debate has not, however, paid
enough attention to the connection between the FISA issue and the Fourth Amendment issue.7
This article attempts to fill the gap.

2

See ACLU v. NSA, No. 06-CV-10204, 2006 WL 2371463, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2006); Letter from
Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of U.S., to Sen. Arlen Specter 1 (Feb. 28, 2006) [hereinafter
Attorney General Letter of Feb. 28, 2006] (stating that the President authorized the "Terrorist Surveillance
Program" in October 2001, before signing the USA PATRIOT Act), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/022806gonzales.pdf; George W. Bush, President of the U.S.,
President's Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html (President states that he authorized
the NSA program "[i]n the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our nation").
3
See, e.g., Jerry Crimins, NSA Wiretaps Debated at U of Chicago, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 1 (Feb. 1, 2006)
(reporting that in public debate Professor Geoffrey R. Stone said the "two primary arguments" against
current program are that it violates the Fourth Amendment and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).
4
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862. For an example of the argument that the program violates FISA, see, e.g.,
Beth Nolan et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, at __. For a
description of FISA, see Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall
Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319, 337-58 (2005).
5
U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
6
See Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance Authority II: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm.
On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. __ (Feb. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006]
(testimony of Ken Gormley, Professor of Constitutional Law, Duquesne University) (arguing that "the
program directly collides with rights of American persons under the Bill of Rights, specifically the Fourth
Amendment"), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1770&wit_id=5228.
7
The connection goes unexplored, for example, in the only published decision so far to address the
constitutionality of the program. See ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463, at *17-*27 (holding the Program
unconstitutional).
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The article reaches a twofold conclusion. First, the President may defy FISA in certain
circumstances by authorizing electronic surveillance that is subject to FISA but that occurs
without compliance with FISA's standards and procedures.8 Furthermore, the very same
circumstances that justify such surveillance "outside FISA"9 can often cause the surveillance to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment even though conducted without a warrant or traditional probable
cause.10 By the same token, when circumstances do not justify surveillance outside FISA, the
government's violation of FISA presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment.11
The circumstances that excuse compliance with both FISA and traditional Fourth
Amendment requirements are ones that constitute a genuine national security emergency.
Precedent suggests that in a "genuine emergency" the President has inherent and
congressionally irreducible power to respond to national security threats. 12 Although at first
blush the Court's recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld13 might be understood to cast doubt
on the existence of such plenary presidential power, on closer examination Hamdan actually
supports its existence. A genuine national security emergency may not only justify Presidential
action that defies an Act of Congress; a genuine emergency may create exigent circumstances
justifying searches and seizures without the usual Fourth Amendment requirements of probable
cause and prior judicial approval. In the absence of a "genuine emergency" that necessitates
defiance of FISA, however, the President's failure to comply with FISA should be presumed to
8

See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
This article follows a convention of current public debate by using the phrase "surveillance outside FISA"
to describe electronic surveillance that is subject to FISA but authorized by the President to be carried out
without complying with FISA. See, e.g., CRS Report on Warrantless Surveillance, supra note __, at 14
(referring to "the President's authorization of electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence
information outside the FISA framework"); United States Department of Justice, Legal Authorities
Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), at
18 (referring to "surveillance outside the procedures set forth in FISA") [hereinafter DOJ White Paper]; id.
at 19 n.6 (referring to communications intercepted "outside FISA procedures").
10
See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
11
See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
12
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that government could detain a citizen in a "genuine
emergency," even if that detention violated an Act of Congress); see also infra notes __-__ and
accompanying text.
13
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
9
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violate the Fourth Amendment because FISA was designed by Congress, in collaboration with
the Executive branch, to implement the Fourth Amendment.
The President's power to authorize surveillance outside FISA in a genuine national
security emergency does not justify the current NSA surveillance program. The program's very
status as an ongoing, broad "program" prevents it from falling within the President's "genuine
emergency" power. The genuine emergency power is limited in scope and duration when it is
exercised against the backdrop of legislation, such as FISA, that is a generally valid regulation
of the President's power to conduct domestic surveillance for national security purposes. For
example, the President may well have had broad power to conduct surveillance outside FISA in
the days and weeks immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. That power
subsided, however, as time and a still-functioning civil government permitted the President to
consult Congress on the appropriate scope of surveillance powers. Today, the President may
still have power to authorize surveillance outside FISA. That power, however, exists only when
FISA's shortcomings make surveillance outside FISA reasonably necessary for national security
purposes. In sum, the President's "genuine emergency" power no longer supports a broad
surveillance program that violates a generally valid Act of Congress.
This analysis underlying this conclusion unfolds in three steps. Part I briefly describes
publicly available information on NSA's domestic surveillance program and the legal controversy
over it. Part II discusses the connection between the President's power to authorize electronic
surveillance outside FISA and Fourth Amendment limits on that power. Principles that emerge
from that discussion are applied to the NSA program in Part III of the article. Part III concludes
that, although in exceptional circumstances the President can authorize surveillance that
violates FISA and does not satisfy customary Fourth Amendment requirements, the current
NSA program of routine, widespread surveillance exceeds the President's power and violates
the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion reflects a more nuanced analysis (and stakes out a
more moderate position) than is offered by most opponents and supporters of the NSA program.
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I hope, for that reason, that the analysis offered here supplies a legal foundation for principled
and politically feasible legislative reform.14
I.

The NSA Program of Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists
International terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11).15 Soon

after 9/11, the President authorized a surveillance program to investigate those attacks and
prevent future ones.16 The program is run by the National Security Agency ("NSA") and
involves electronic surveillance, such as wiretapping telephones.17 Many details of the program
remain secret.18 The government admits, however, that NSA monitors phone calls and email
that are made (1) to or from the United States and a foreign country; (2) by, or to, someone
whom the government has a "reasonable grounds" to believe has ties to al Qa'eda, the terrorist
network responsible for the 9/11 attacks, "or an affiliated terrorist organization."19 The

14

See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text (citing and discussing current commentary). I am not
aware of any published scholarship examining the connection between the issue of whether the current
NSA program violates FISA and the issue of whether it violates the Fourth Amendment. The connection
does receive attention, however, in a recent court filing by the Center for National Security Studies and
The Constitution Project. See Memorandum of the Constitution Project and the Center for National
Security Studies in Response to U.S. Department of Justice's Defense of Warrantless Electronic
Surveillance at 42-46, In re Warrantless Electronic Surveillance (filed Feb. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Amicus
Memo, In re Warrantless Electronic Surveillance], available at
http://www.cnss.org/FISC%20Memorandum%20(signed).PDF.
15
See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller with David E. Sanger, A Somber Bush Says Terrorism Cannot Prevail,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1.
16
See Attorney General Letter of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at 1 (stating that the President authorized
the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" about which Gonzales previously testified before Congress in
October 2001, before signing the USA PATRIOT Act).
17
Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance Authority I: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. On
th
the Judiciary, 109 Cong,. __ (Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006] (testimony of
Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of U.S.) ("[T]his program is administered by career professionals
at NSA."), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1727&wit_id=3936; id. at __
(testimony of Attorney General Gonzales) ("[T]he NSA did not commence the kind of electronic
surveillance which I am discussing here today prior to the president's authorization.").
18
Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006, supra, note __, at __(testimony of Attorney General Gonzales) ("Many
operational details of our intelligence activities remain classified and unknown to our enemy.").
19
Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of Attorney General Gonzales) (stating
that "only international communications are authorized for interception" -- i.e., "communications between
a foreign country and this country" -- and that surveillance is triggered "only when a career professional at
the NSA has reasonable grounds to believe that one of the parties to a communication is a member of
agent of Al Qaida or an affiliated terrorist organization"); DOJ White Paper, supra note 5, at ("The
President has acknowledged that, to counter this [al Qaeda] threat, he has authorized the NSA to
intercept international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al Qaeda or
related terrorist organizations.").
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government also seemingly admits that some of this surveillance is subject to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA") but has not been conducted in compliance with
FISA's requirements.20 This admission means that the NSA program may be illegal on either of
two grounds (or both).
First, the NSA program may violate FISA. FISA prescribes "the exclusive means by
which electronic surveillance [for foreign intelligence purposes] … may be conducted" in the
United States.21 FISA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended FISA to govern all
domestic electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.22 Congress made FISA

20

See Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal
Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2006) (statement of Attorney General Gonzales) ("[I]in
terms of legal authorities, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides -- requires a court order -before engaging in this kind of surveillance that I've just discussed and the President announced on
Saturday, unless … otherwise authorized by statute or by Congress.") [hereinafter Attorney General
Press Briefing of Dec. 2005], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html; cf. DOJ White Paper, supra
note __, at 17 n.5 ("To avoid revealing details about the operation of the program, it is assumed for
purposes of this paper that the activities described by the President constitute 'electronic surveillance,' as
defined by FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)."); Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General,
U.S. Dept of Justice, to Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, U.S. House of Rep. Judiciary
Comm., encl. at 10 (Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Moschella Letter of Mar. 24, 2006] (stating that DOJ
Whitepaper "assumes, solely for purposes of that analysis, that the targeted interception of international
communications authorized under the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program would constitute
'electronic surveillance' as defined in FISA, but Department "cannot confirm whether that is actually the
case without disclosing sensitive classified information"), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj032406.pdf.
21
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f). Section 2511(2)(f) also authorizes "electronic surveillance … and the
interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications" to occur under Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title III") and under Chapter 121 of Part I of Title 18, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712. Title III authorizes wiretaps for criminal investigations, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516 &
2518(3)(a) (wiretap order requires probable cause that individual targeted for the wiretap is involved in
one of enumerated offenses), and Chapter 121 concerns access to stored electronic communications,
such as email messages for the investigation of criminal offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (generally
prohibiting unauthorized access to "a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage" in
a "a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided"); id. § 1803(a) & (d)
(authorizing access to wire or electronic communications and customer records for an "offense under
investigation" and for "an ongoing criminal investigation"). See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. W ASH. L. REV. 1208
(2004) (explicating Chapter 121 and suggesting legislative revisions). The government has not claimed
that either Title III or Chapter 121 supports the current NSA surveillance program, leaving FISA as the
"exclusive" means of surveillance, under § 2511(2)(f). In addition to the exclusivity provision in Section
2511(2)(f), FISA provides: "A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally engages in electronic
surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute." 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1).
22
The exclusivity provision in Section 2511(2)(f) of FISA replaced a provision in Title III stating that Title III
did not limit the President's power to "take such measures as he deems necessary" to protect national
security. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat.
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exclusive to stop executive abuses exposed in the 1970s through efforts such as the Church
Committee investigations.23 The Church Committee revealed that Presidents since Franklin D.
Roosevelt had authorized warrantless surveillance of Americans.24 Although Presidents
claimed "inherent" power to authorize this surveillance for "national security" purposes, the
surveillance often targeted people merely because of their political views.25 By enacting FISA in
1978, Congress intended to "prohibit the President, notwithstanding any inherent powers," from

214 (1968), repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92
Stat. 1797. Because the prior provision was designed to preserve the President's "inherent" constitutional
authority, if any, to authorize surveillance that was not authorized by any statute, its repealer reinforces
Congress's intent to eliminate the President's inherent power in this area, to the extent Congress was
able to do so. So does Congress's enactment of § 2511(2)(f) instead of proposed provisions that, unlike
§ 2511(2)(f), continued to recognize possible inherent presidential power to conduct national security
th
surveillance without statutory authorization. See S.3197, 94 Cong. § 2528, reprinted in Hearings on S.
743, S. 1888, S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. On Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Sen. Comm. on the
th
Judiciary, 94 Cong 134 (1976) (bill provision stating that legislation proposed in the bill would not "limit
the constitutional power of the President to order electronic surveillance" for national security purposes);
H. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1270, at 35 (1978) (observing that House version provided that FISA and Title III
would be "the exclusive statutory means" by which President could conduct surveillance, but Conference
selected Senate version, "which omits the word 'statutory'"); Ira S. Shapiro, The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act: Legislative Balancing of National Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV. J. ON
th
LEGIS. 119, 123 n.11 (1977) (quoting later version of S. 3197, 94 Cong. (1976), in which Senate
Intelligence Committee narrowed the bill so that it referred to President's possible constitutional authority
to conduct surveillance 'if the facts and circumstances giving rise to the acquisition are so unprecedented
and potentially harmful to the Nation that they cannot reasonably be said to have been within the
contemplation of Congress"). Other legislative history expresses Congress's intent in FISA to eliminate
the President's inherent power to conduct national security surveillance. See S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. I, at
6 (1978) (bill enacted as FISA "recognizes no inherent power of the President in this area"); id. at 64 ("As
to methods of acquisition which come within the definition of 'electronic surveillance' in this bill, the
Congress has declared that this statute, not any claimed presidential power, controls."); H.R. REP. No. 951283, pt. 1, at 24 (1976) ("[E]ven if the President has the inherent authority in the absence of legislation to
authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, Congress has the power to
regulate the conduct of such surveillance by legislating a reasonable procedure, when then becomes the
exclusive means by which such surveillance may be conducted."); see also Senate Hearing of Feb. 6,
2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of Attorney General Gonzales) ("There is no question, if you look at
the legislative history [of FISA] …, that Congress intended to try to limit whatever president's inherent
authority existed.").
23
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 8 (1977) (bill that became FISA "is designed …. to curb the practice
by which the Executive Branch may conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on its own unilateral
determination that national security justifies it"); see also Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan
Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 319, 336-37 & nn. 66-71 (2005) (discussing and citing relevant legislative history).
24
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 7-8 (1977).
25
See, e.g., id. at 8.
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conducting domestic electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes without complying
with FISA.26
Ever since the post-9/11 NSA program of domestic surveillance came to light in late
2005, however, President George W. Bush has claimed both statutory and constitutional power
to conduct surveillance "outside FISA." The statutory power, he contends, comes from post9/11 legislation entitled the "Authorization for the Use of Military Force" ("AUMF").27 He also
claims "inherent constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and sole organ for the Nation in
foreign affairs."28

26

See note __ supra (citing legislative history of FISA indicating Congress's intent that FISA be the
exclusive source of executive branch power to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
information); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at (1978) ("[D]espite any inherent power of the
President to authorize warrantless electronic surveillances in the absence of legislation, by this bill [and
Title III …, Congress will have legislated with regard to electronic surveillance in the United States, that
legislation with its procedures and safeguard prohibit the President, notwithstanding any inherent powers,
from violating the terms of that legislation."). Section 111 of FISA makes clear that Congress intended
FISA to apply -- to the exclusion of the President's inherent powers -- even during wartime. Section 111
says, "[T]he President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a
court order … to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days
following a declaration of war by the Congress." 50 U.S.C. § 1811. I thank Louis Fisher for pointing out
to me the significance of this provision. E-mail from Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of
Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, to Richard Henry Seamon, Professor of
Law, University of Idaho college of Law (July 12, 2006 6:59 AM) (on file with author).
27
See, e.g., Attorney General Press Briefing of Dec. 2005, supra note __ ("Our position is that the
th
authorization to use force, which was passed by the Congress in the days following September 11 ,
constitutes th[e] other authorization [to which FISA refers] … to engage in this kind of signals
intelligence."); Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of Attorney General
Gonzales) ("[T]he resolution authorizing the use of military force is exactly the sort of later statutory
authorization contemplated by FISA's safety valve."); see also Authorization for Use of Military Force,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat, 224 (Sept. 18, 2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note
(Authorization for Use of Military Force).
28
See Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales) (President's "inherent authorities" under Constitution "include the power to spy on enemies like
Al Qaida without prior approval from other branches of government"); DOJ White Paper, supra note __, at
1 (to the same effect).
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The President's reliance on the AUMF is weak.29 The AUMF in relevant part authorizes
the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [9/11] terrorist
attacks."30 The problem is that, in context, the term "force" cannot be reasonably construed to
authorize domestic electronic surveillance. Not coincidentally, members of Congress have
almost universally rejected the President's reliance on the AUMF.31 Because the AUMF does
not authorize the NSA program, the President's power to authorize the NSA program depends
on his constitutional powers, as validly reduced by FISA.32

29

See, e.g., Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (prepared statement of Harold Hongju
Koh, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School)
(President's reliance on AUMF "does not pass the 'straight face' test"), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1770&wit_id=3938; American Bar Association, Task Force
on Domestic Surveillance in the Fight Against Terrorism, Report 5 (Feb. 2006) ("There is nothing in either
the language of the AUMF or its legislative history" to support NSA surveillance program) [hereinafter
ABA Task Force Report on NSA Surveillance], available at
http://www.abanet.org/op/greco/memos/aba_house302-0206.pdf; see also ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL
2371463, at *23-*24 (holding that NSA program is not authorized by AUMF). But see DOJ White Paper,
supra note __, at 10 ("The AUMF confirms and supplements the President's inherent power to use
warrantless surveillance against the enemy in the current armed conflict.") (capitalization altered); Andrew
C. McCarthy et al., NSA's Warrantless Surveillance Program: Legal, Constitutional, and Necessary 60-63
in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE AND THE CONSTITUTION (undated) (arguing that
AUMF supports NSA program), http://www.fed-soc.org/pdf/terroristsurveillance.pdf Letter from Robert Alt,
Fellow in Legal and International Affairs, John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, to Hon. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., 2 (Feb. 2006) ("[T]he scope of the President's electronic surveillance program … is
consistent with the scope of the AUMF's authorization of the use of force."), available at
http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/dialogue/alt_judiciary.html.
30
AUMF § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Authorization for Use of Military
Force).
31
See, e.g., Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006, supra note __, at __ (statement of Sen. Specter) (stating
that in his opinion AUMF does not authorize the NSA program). But cf. Letter from Sen. Pat Roberts to
Sens. Arlen Specter and Patrick J. Leahy 17 (Feb. 3, 2006) (defending surveillance program primarily
based on president's inherent powers but stating: "I do not discount the legal arguments of the
Department of Justice concerning the [AUMF]."), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/roberts020306.pdf.
32
See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
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In addition to violating FISA, the NSA program may violate the Fourth Amendment.33
The Fourth Amendment applies to some electronic surveillance, because electronic surveillance
can constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.34 Reflecting a
traditional Fourth Amendment requirement, FISA ordinarily requires the government to get a
court order before conducting electronic surveillance.35 To get a court order, the government
must show "probable cause" that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a
foreign power.36 FISA's requirement for a court order based on probable cause, combined with
the other FISA requirements, has led courts to reject Fourth Amendment challenges to
surveillance that complies with FISA.37 By the same token, surveillance outside FISA may

33

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., William Banks, NSA Eavesdropping and the Fourth Amendment,
JURIST-FORUM, Mar. 8, 2006 (arguing that "this domestic spying violates the Fourth Amendment"),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/03/nsa-eavesdropping-and-fourth-amendment.php; Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2 ¶ 3 & 59 ¶ 193, American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security
Agency, Civ. No. 06-CV-10204 (E.D. Mich. filed Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter ACLU v. NSA] (alleging
program violates Fourth Amendment), available at http://cdt.org/security/nsa/20060117aclu-complaint.pdf;
Complaint at 2 ¶ 2 & 15 ¶ 50, Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-00313 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter CCR v. Bush] (similar allegations), available at http://www.ccrny.org/v2/legal/govt_misconduct/docs/NSAcomplaintFINAL11706.pdf; cf. Letter from Curtis A. Bradley,
Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of Law, Duke Univ., to Sen. Bill Frist et al. 5 (Jan. 9. 2006)
[hereinafter Law Professors' Letter to Congress] (stating that program raises serious Fourth Amendment if
considered to be statutorily authorized), available at
http://www.cdt.org/security/20060109legalexpertsanalysis.pdf.
34
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that search occurred when
government attached an electronic listening device to outside of phone booth and overhead the person
speaking on the phone inside the booth); see also Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 326-31 (1967)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to government's electronic recording of conversation when government
first obtained warrant authorizing the recording); Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the
Partial Ascendance of Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment, 79 W ASH. U.L.Q. 1013, 1013-14 (2001)
(discussing applicability of Fourth Amendment to technological developments in surveillance).
35
50 U.S.C. § 1805.
36
Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
37
th
United States v. Damrah, 124 F. App'x 976, 983 (6 Cir. 2005) ("FISA has uniformly been held to be
consistent with the Fourth Amendment."); see, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 736-46 (Foreign Int.
Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to FISA); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d
th
1067, 1075 (4 Cir. 1987) ("We now join the other courts of appeals that have reviewed FISA and held
th
that the statute meets constitutional requirements."); United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9
Cir. 1987) ("FISA satisfies the constraints the Fourth Amendment places on foreign intelligence
surveillance conducted by the government."); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984)
("We regard the procedures fashioned in DISA as a constitutionally adequate balancing of the individual's
Fourth Amendment rights against the nation's need to obtain foreign intelligence information.").
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violate the Fourth Amendment precisely because it occurs without a court order38 and without
meeting the other requirements of FISA, possibly including its substantive standard of "probable
cause." 39
Public debate on the NSA program has centered on whether it violates FISA or the
Fourth Amendment.40 The debate has not scrutinized the connection between the FISA issue
and the Fourth Amendment issue. Nor was the connection detected, much less explored, in the
only published court opinion so far to address a legal challenge to the NSA program.41 Indeed,
the significance of the connection between the FISA issue and the Fourth Amendment issue is
not obvious. In commenting on a draft of this article, Judge Richard Posner asked why this
connection is important if, as this article concludes, the current NSA program violates both FISA
and the Fourth Amendment. To quote Judge Posner, "If the NSA program violates FISA, what

38

See Attorney General Press Briefing of Dec. 2005, supra note __ (Attorney General Gonzales stating
U.S.'s position that it is not legally required to get court approval for NSA surveillance program disclosed
in December 2005).
39
Compare DOJ White Paper, supra note __, at 5 (stating that surveillance under NSA program requires
"a reasonable basis to believe that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, associated
with al Qaeda or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda") with Alberto R. Gonzales,
Prepared Remarks for Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the Georgetown University Law Center
(Jan. 24, 2006) ("the standard applied [for surveillance under NSA program] S 'reasonable basis to
believe' S- is essentially the same as the traditional Fourth Amendment probable cause standard."); and
Moschella Letter of Mar. 24, 2006, supra note __, encl. at 2-3 (Mar. 24, 2006) (equating "reasonable
basis" standard to "probable cause").
40
See, e.g., Law Professors' Letter to Congress, supra note __, at 5 (arguing that program violates FISA
and "would raise serious questions under the Fourth Amendment); Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006,
supra note __, at __ (testimony of Prof. Ken Gormley) (stating that NSA program violates FISA and
Fourth Amendment); ABA Task Force Report on NSA Surveillance, supra note __, at 10, 13 (presenting
two arguments: that "Congress did not implicitly authorize the NSA domestic spying program in the
AUMF, and in fact expressly prohibited it in FISA"; and that "construing the AUMF to authorize such
wiretapping would raise serious questions under the Fourth Amendment"); see also Complaint at 13-15,
CCR v. Bush, supra note __ (alleging that NSA program violates, among other laws, FISA, separation of
powers, and First and Fourth Amendments); Complaint at 59, ACLU v. NSA, supra note __ (alleging
violations of First Amendment rights, separation of powers, and Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
with the APA violation arising from program's violation of FISA).
41
See ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463, at *17-*27; see also Editorial, Ruling for the Law, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 18, 2006, at A16 (describing decision in ACLU v. NSA as holding that NSA program violated FISA,
the Fourth Amendment, and the First Amendment); cf. Editorial, A Judicial Misfire, W ASH. POST, Aug. 18,
2006, at A20 (observing that opinion in ACLU v. NSA "is neither careful nor scholarly").
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is the point of saying that therefore it also violates the Fourth Amendment?" 42 A court made the
converse point in recently striking down the NSA program, stating the view that it is "irrelevant"
whether the NSA program violates restrictions validly imposed by FISA because the program
violates the Fourth Amendment.43
My contention, developed over the next two parts of this article, is that the NSA program
violates the Fourth Amendment precisely because it violates FISA. In other words, the NSA
program violates the Fourth Amendment today -- because FISA is on the books -- even though
the program may very well not have violated the Fourth Amendment before FISA was enacted
and might very well not violate the Fourth Amendment if FISA were repealed. Congress's
enactment of a statute that is within Congress's power and that is designed to implement the
Fourth Amendment alters the Fourth Amendment analysis. In this sense, Congress can affect
the substance of the Fourth Amendment. Recognizing Congress’s power to enact statutes that
alter Fourth Amendment reasonableness illuminates linkage between the Fourth Amendment
and separation of powers doctrine. In addition, an understanding of the connection informs the
broader debate on the roles of legislatures and courts in enforcing the Fourth Amendment.44
II.

Presidential Power to Conduct Domestic Electronic Surveillance for National Security
Purposes Within Fourth Amendment Constraints
The analysis of whether the NSA program violates FISA differs from, but overlaps with,

the analysis of whether the NSA program violates the Fourth Amendment. The issue of whether
the program violates FISA requires a separation of powers analysis that draws a line between
the President's power and Congress's power.45 The issue of whether the program violates the
42

E-mail from Judge Richard Posner, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to Richard Henry
Seamon, Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law (July 8, 2006 8:07 pm) (on file with
author); see also ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463 .
43
ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463, at *25.
44
See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 804 (2004) (critiquing "popular view" that courts should take
a primary role in enforcing privacy threatened by technology; urging an important role for legislature); cf.
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call for Judicial
Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (2005) (criticizing Professor Kerr's critique).
45
See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
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Fourth Amendment entails a reasonableness analysis that strikes a balance between
governmental and individual interests.46 Despite this difference in analyses, the FISA issue and
the Fourth Amendment issue overlap when it comes to identifying what the President can and
cannot do.
Specifically, as discussed below in Section A, FISA is unconstitutional -- and the
President can therefore disregard it -- when doing so is required by exigent circumstances of
national security.47 Furthermore, electronic surveillance conducted under exigent national
security circumstances will satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even if it does not meet the
traditional Fourth Amendment requirements of prior judicial approval and probable cause, if, as
will often be true, the surveillance falls within the exigent circumstances doctrine of Fourth
Amendment law. As discussed in Section B below, however, when national security exigencies
do not exist, the President's failure to comply with FISA exceeds his authority and presumptively
violates the Fourth Amendment.48
The connection between the FISA issue and the Fourth Amendment issue reflects that
both separation of powers doctrine and Fourth Amendment doctrine recognize plenary
executive power when necessary to protect national security. The second conclusion reflects
that, outside of such exceptional circumstances, both separation of powers and Fourth
Amendment doctrine support legislative and judicial checks on the executive to prevent
executive abuse of individual rights.
A.

Presidential Powers in a "Genuine Emergency"

As noted above, the President seemingly admits that after 9/11 he authorized "electronic
surveillance" within the meaning of FISA without following FISA's requirements.49 As also noted
above, this surveillance outside FISA is not authorized by the later-enacted AUMF (or any other

46

See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
48
See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
49
See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
47
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statute).50 Because neither the AUMF nor any other statute authorizes the surveillance, only the
President's "inherent powers" can do so, and they can do so only to the extent that those
inherent powers cannot validly be restricted by FISA. To say that FISA invalidly restricts the
President's inherent powers reflects a conclusion that FISA violates the separation of powers
doctrine.51
I join other commentators in believing that analysis of this issue will be governed by
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.52 In Youngstown, the Court invalidated President
Truman's attempt to take over the nation's steel mills. Truman attempted the takeover to ensure
that, despite labor unrest, the mills would continue to produce materiel for the Korean War.53
Truman argued that "his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would
inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave emergency
[he] was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation's Chief Executive
and the commander in chief of the Armed Forces."54 The Court rejected that argument. It held

50

See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Attorney General Letter of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at 5 ("[I]f an interpretation of FISA
that allows the President to conduct the NSA activities were not fairly possible, and if FISA were read to
impede the President's ability to undertake actions necessary to fulfill his constitutional obligation to
protect the Nation from foreign attack in the context of a congressionally authorized armed conflict against
an enemy that has already staged the most deadly foreign attack in our Nation's history, there would be
serious doubt about the constitutionality of FISA as so applied."); McCarthy, supra note __, at 33-34
(similar argument).
52
343 U.S. 579 (1952). See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463, at *21-*24 (relying on Youngstown
in analyzing NSA program); Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
th
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109 Cong. __ (Jan. 9,
2006) (testimony of Judge Samuel Alito) (stating that "I think one might look to Justice Jackson's
framework" in Youngstown in addressing president's power to authorize NSA program); Senate Hearing
of Feb. 6, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of Attorney General Gonzales) ("[I]f Congress were to
take some kind of action, and say the president no longer has the authority to engage in electronic
surveillance of the enemy, then I think that would put us into the third part of Justice Jackson's three-part
test" in Youngstown); ABA Task Force Report on NSA Surveillance, supra note __, at 13 (applying the
"criteria set forth in Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion in Youngstown" to analyze President's
authorization of NSA program); Law Professors' Letter to Congress, supra note __, at 15 (relying on
Justice Jackson's "influential opinion" in Youngstown to analyze President's power to authorize the NSA
program). But cf. McCarthy, supra note __, at 49-51 (Court's modern approach to separation of powers
analysis is "more balanced and cautious" than Jackson's framework suggests when read in isolation).
53
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-89.
54
Id. at 582.
51
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that Truman's action was not authorized by any statute or any extra-statutory power that the
President has under the Constitution.55
The most authoritative opinion from Youngstown has come to be, not the majority's
opinion, but Justice Jackson's concurrence.56 In his concurrence, Justice Jackson set out a
three-part framework for analyzing the President's power.57 The framework reflects the
interdependence of the President and Congress in certain matters, including war.58 Under the
first part of the framework, the President's power is "at its maximum" when he or she acts with
the express or implied authorization of Congress.59 In this first situation, the President has "all
[of the power] that he [or she] possesses in his [or her] own right plus all that Congress can
delegate."60 The second part of the framework applies when the President acts with neither
congressional approval nor congressional denial of his or her authority. In this second situation,
the President "can only rely upon his [or her] own independent powers." 61 The third part of the
framework applies when the President takes action "incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress." 62 In this third situation, the President's power "is at its lowest ebb, for then he
[or she] can rely only upon his [or her] own constitutional powers minus any constitutional

55

Id. at 585 ("The President's power, if any, … must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself."); id. at 585-88 (holding that executive order did not fall within any statute or
constitutional power).
56
Id. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring); see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981)
(stating that, as parties in that case agreed, Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown "brings
together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area"); Patricia L. Bellia,
Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadow, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 89 n.11 (2002) (citing commentary
recognizing influence of Jackson's concurrence); see also supra note __ (citing sources relying on
Jackson's Youngstown framework to analyze President's power to authorize the current NSA surveillance
program).
57
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
58
Id. at 635.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 637.
62
Id. at 637-38.
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powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive President control in such a
case only by disabling Congress from acting upon the subject."63
Justice Jackson's framework makes it important to determine whether the NSA program
is authorized by -- or is instead inconsistent with -- the express or implied will of Congress. The
President argues that the NSA program is authorized by the AUMF, but this argument lacks
merit.64 Without the AUMF to support it, electronic surveillance under the NSA program violates
FISA and so presents Justice Jackson's third situation. Accordingly, the surveillance can fall
within the President's power, despite violating FISA, only to the extent that Congress is
constitutionally "disable[ed]" from curbing the President's power.65 The question becomes to
what extent Congress can regulate the President's conduct of domestic electronic surveillance
for national security purposes.
Precedent establishes that Congress has some regulatory power in this matter, but the
precedent leaves the scope of that power unclear. The relevant precedent includes FISA itself,
which was supported by Presidents Carter and Ford as a legitimate regulation of the President's
power.66 Unfortunately, this legislative precedent has no direct analog in Supreme Court
precedent. The Supreme Court has said that Congress can regulate electronic surveillance in
the United States to investigate national security threats posed by domestic organizations.67
The Court has not addressed congressional regulation of surveillance of threats to national

63

Id. at 637-38; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006) ("Whether or not the
President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions,
he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on
his powers") (citing Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637).
64
See supra note __ and accompanying text.
65
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38.
66
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (to issue order authorizing electronic surveillance, court must find that "the
target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power"); see also id. §
1801(a) & (b) (defining "foreign power" and "agent of a foreign power"); Seamon & Gardner, supra note
__, at 336-37 (documenting support of Ford and Carter Administrations for FISA).
67
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 324 (1972) (Keith) ("prior judicial approval is
required for the type of domestic security surveillance involved in this case and … such approval may be
made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe").
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security posed by foreign agents and powers.68 Though not addressing that specific issue, the
Court has recognized that Congress has significant power over foreign relations -- power that
stems from, among other places, its power over foreign commerce.69 On the other hand, the
Court has recognized that the President, too, has significant power over foreign affairs, including
matters of foreign intelligence, that exists independently of Congress's power.70 Precedent
does not establish to what extent the President's power is not only independent but also
"plenary" -- meaning not reducible by Congress.

68

See Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, at __ (testimony of Robert F. Turner) (stating that Keith case has
been misunderstood as bearing on President's power to conduct surveillance of foreign threats to national
security; Keith dealt only with "internal threats from domestic organizations"); id. at __ (stating that Keith
"made no suggestion that Congress should put any constraints on foreign intelligence gathering"); see
also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 533 (1985) (distinguishing surveillance of foreign threats to
national security from surveillance of domestic threats to national security). Of course, although Keith
does not address congressional regulation of surveillance of foreign threats to national security, nor does
it cast doubt on Congress's power to regulate that subject.
69
See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 351-52 (1903) ("the commerce with foreign countries … which
Congress c[an] regulate … includ[es] … the transmission by telegraph of ideas, wishes, orders, and
intelligence") (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347 (1887)). In addition to Congress's
power to regulate the executive branch's gathering of foreign intelligence, Congress can regulate the
federal courts' admission of evidence derived from that intelligence gathering, as Congress has done in
FISA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e) (authorizing motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of FISA);
see also Usery v. Tuner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1976) (stating that Congress "has plenary
power over the promulgation of evidentiary rules for the federal courts"). See generally Max Kidalov &
Richard H. Seamon, The Missing Pieces of the Debate Over Federal Property Rights Legislation, 27
HASTINGS CONST'L L.Q. 1, 60-61 (1999) (discussing Congress's power to make rules for the federal
courts).
70
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (referring to "the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations -- a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress"); see also Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 110 (1948)
("Congress may of course delegate very large grants of its power over foreign commerce to the
President. The President also possesses in his [or her] own right certain powers conferred by the
Constitution on him [or her] as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ in foreign affairs. [In those
roles, he or she] has available intelligence services whose reports neither are nor ought to be published
to the world."). In citing Curtiss-Wright, I do not mean to endorse its reasoning, which has received
withering, cogent criticism. Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1973) (concluding that "major segments" of Curtiss-Wright
rest on history that is "shockingly inaccurate"); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An
Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 496 (1946) (finding "little room" for
acceptance of Curtiss-Wright's concept of President's inherent extra-constitutional powers in "political and
constitutional ideas" prevailing at time of American Revolution and framing of Constitution). I am arguing
that the President has some margin to act contrary to law, provided it is not very long and he or she gets
statutory authority as quickly as possible. In Curtiss-Wright, Sutherland saw no need for statutory
authority. The President had exclusive, independent, inherent, and extraconstitutional powers, not
dependent at all on congressional support. See E-mail from Louis Fisher, supra note __.
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Though not providing clear guidance, history and precedent suggest that the President
has congressionally irreducible power to "repel sudden attacks" on the country.71 In The Prize
Cases, for example, the Court upheld the President Lincoln's power to blockade southern ports
in the days after the Confederacy's attack on union forces at Fort Sumter.72 The Court made
clear this power did not depend on legislative authorization, stating: "If a war be made by
invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by
force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any
special legislative authority. … He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands."73
Significantly,The Prize Cases was a 5-to-4 decision, with the four dissenters concluding that,
because Congress had not declared war, "the President had no power to set on foot a
blockade."74 The Court's decision, in substance and voting alignment, implies at most a narrow
power in the President to take defensive measures in response to attacks on the country -- and

71

See, e.g., Committee on International Security Affairs of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York,
The Legality and Constitutionality of the President's Authority to Initiate an Invasion of Iraq, 41 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 15, 19 n.13 (2002) ("Messrs. Madison and Gerry jointly introduced the amendment to
substitute 'declare' for 'make' [in the clause enumerating Congress's war power]. They noted the change
would 'leav[e] to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.' M. Farrand, The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937), at 318, cited in The Constitution of the United States of
America: Analysis and Interpretation, Congressional Research Service (1992), at 308, note 1420."); see
also War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(c), 87 Stat. 555 (1973), (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1541(c)) ("The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances are exercised pursuant to [in addition to congressional authorization] …
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, it territories or possessions, or its
armed forces"); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology
Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 852-63 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL W AR POWER (1995))
(describing range of scholarly views on President's war powers, including power to repel imminent attacks
on the country). Presidential power expert Louis Fisher traces the claim of presidential power to act
contrary to law in cases of genuine emergency to the Lockean Prerogative. See LOUIS FISHER,
th
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 259-260 (rev. 4 ed. 1997). Until
recently, Presidents exercised the power but later sought authorization from Congress. Id. at 260-62.
72
The Amy Warwick ("The Prize Cases"), 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
73
Id. at 670.
74
Id. at 698 (Nelson, J., dissenting, joined by Taney, C.J., and Catron and Clifford, JJ.); see also Holmes
v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 946-947 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing The Prize Cases).
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one that may exist in the absence of "special legislative authority" but that does not necessarily
exist when it contradicts legislative authority.75
More recently, two Justices in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld recognized a similar, but broader,
emergency power to respond to threats to national security.76 In Hamdi, Justice Souter (joined
by Justice Ginsburg) dissented from a decision upholding the detention of an asserted enemy
combatant who is also a U.S. citizen.77 Justice Souter concluded that an Act of Congress
barred the detention.78 He suggested, however, that the executive branch might be able to
detain a citizen, even in violation of the statute, "in a moment of genuine emergency, when the
Government must act with no time for deliberation."79 The plurality did not address this issue
because it held -- contrary to Justice Souter's dissent (but in basic agreement with Justice
Thomas's dissent) -- that the detention in that case was authorized by federal statute.80 The
75

See also Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[W]hatever special powers the
Executive may hold in national security situations must be limited to instances of immediate and grave
peril to the nation. Absent such exigent circumstances, there can be no appeal to powers beyond those
enumerated in the Constitution or provided by law."); cf. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1804)
(captain of U.S. vessel was personally liable in damages for seizing a vessel in violation of statute, even
though the seizure comported with presidential orders, because presidential orders misconstrued the
statute). As Dr. Louis Fisher observed in commenting on a draft of this article, the Prize Cases may also
be distinguishable from what is called the "global war on terrorism," of which the current NSA surveillance
program is part, because President Lincoln acted in a domestic context, rather than in a context in which
he was taking the country from a state of peace to a state of war with another nation. See E-mail from
Louis Fisher, supra note __ (citing Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 660 (argument of counsel for government,
distinguishing foreign war from civil war)).
76
542 U.S. 507 (2004); see also Joseph R. Biden, Jr, & John B. Ritch III, The War Power at a
Constitutional Impasse: A 'Joint Decision' Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367, 372 (1988) (proposing a "joint
decision" model under which presidential power to use force in absence of statutory authorization "derives
from the concept of emergency: the need to repel an attack on the United States or its forces, to forestall
an imminent attack, or to rescue United States citizens whose lives are imperiled").
77
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539-54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
78
Id. at 541.
79
Id. at 552.
80
Id. at 517 (O'Connor, J., announcing judgment of the Court and delivering an opinion in which
Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ., joined) (holding that "Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi's
detention"); id. at 579-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding that President's detention of Hamdi fell within
"powers vested in the President by the Constitution and with explicit congressional approval"). Justice
Thomas believed that the plurality understood the President's power under the Constitution and the
AUMF too narrowly. See id. at 587-93. Justice Thomas also disagreed with the Court's disposition,
which remanded the case for Hamdi to have "a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for
[his] detention" (id. at 509 (opinion of O'Connor, J., announcing judgment of the Court); id. at 553 (Souter,
J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in remand)). See id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding
that "there is no reason to remand the case" because Hamdi's habeas challenge should fail).
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Hamdi dissent implies that the President's power to take action "incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress" (the third situation identified by Justice Jackson's
Youngstown concurrence) may include the power to take immediate action to respond to a
"genuine emergency" threatening national security.81 Furthermore, the Hamdi dissent did not
limit its implication of presidential power to situations involving an actual attack. Indeed, even
before Hamdi many commentators believed that the President's power encompasses taking
defensive measures necessary to thwart imminent attacks.82
Initially, the Court's recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld might be read to cast doubt
on the existence of any plenary power in the President to defy an Act of Congress when he
believes it necessary to respond to a national security threat.83 In Hamdan, the Court held that
the President violated an Act of Congress -- namely, the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) -- when he established military tribunals to try aliens detained in the war on terrorism.84
The Court held that the President's order establishing the tribunals violated two UCMJ
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Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See Biden & Ritch, supra note __, at 398-99 (proposing legislation that authorizes the President,
without additional statutory authority, to take various actions including "to forestall an imminent act of
international terrorism known to be directed at citizens or nationals of the United States"); Stromseth,
supra note __, at 862-863 (expressing the view that President has power without congressional consent
to respond not only to actual attacks but also to "imminent attacks" and to "exercise the nation's
fundamental right of self-defense when a foreign force "by its own actions placed the United States in a
state of war"); Jane E. Stromseth, Collective Force and Constitutional Responsibility: War Powers in the
Post-Cold War Era, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 145, 159 (1995) ("In exceptional cases, the President may
determine that aggression short of an attack or imminent attack against the United States poses a threat
to the country's security that is serious enough to warrant dispatching American forces into combat within
a time frame that precludes prior approval from Congress."); William Van Alstyne, Congress, the
President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1972) ("[T]he
lodgment of the power to declare war exclusively in Congress forbids the sustained use of armed force
abroad in the absence of a prior, affirmative, explicit authorization by Congress, subject to the one
emergency exception: an interim emergency defense power in the President to employ armed force to
resist invasion or to repel a sudden armed attack until Congress can be properly convened to deliberate
on the question as to whether it will sustain or expand the effort by specific declaration or, by doing
nothing, require the President to disengage our forces from the theater of action."); cf. Martin v. Mott, 25
U.S. 19, 29 (1827) (stating of Congress's power that "the power to provide for repelling invasions includes
the power to provide against the attempt and danger of invasion, as the necessary and proper means to
effectuate the object").
83
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
84
Id. at 2790-98.
82
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provisions. First, the President's order violated Article 36 of the UCMJ. 85 Article 36, as the
Court interpreted it, requires rules the rules for military tribunals to be the same as the rules for
courts martial to the extent practicable.86 Although the President had determined that it would
be impracticable to have the military tribunals operate under the same rules as do courts
martial, the Court found that determination "insufficient."87 Second, the Court found that the
President's rules for military tribunals violated UCMJ Article 21. Article 21 requires the rules for
military tribunals to comply with "the law of war."88 The Court determined that the tribunals'
rules violated the Geneva Conventions, which the government conceded are part of "the law of
war."89 In short, the Court invalidated the President's rules because they conflicted with an Act
of Congress.
Some early commentators believe that Hamdan casts serious doubt on the legality of the
NSA surveillance program because that program, like the President's rules for tribunals, violates
an Act of Congress: namely, the FISA.90 The provisions of the UCMJ at issue in Hamdan,
however, unlike the FISA provisions with which the NSA surveillance program conflicts, were
not challenged by the government as unconstitutionally infringing on the President's inherent
powers. As Justice Thomas noted in his Hamdan dissent, the Court did not need to decide the
President has inherent authority to use military tribunals to try suspected terrorists.91 The issue
before the Court was whether the President's action fell within "certain statutes, duly enacted by
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Id. at 2790 (discussing Art. 36 of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836).
Id. at 2790-93.
87
Id. at 2791.
88
Id. at 2794 (discussing Article 21 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 821).
89
Id. at 2794.
90
See Editorial, Who Watches Those Who Watch Us?, NW. FLA. (FORT W ALTON BEACH) DAILY NEWS, July
26, 2006, (quoting interview in which Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of Electronic Privacy
Information Center, states that Hamdan "told the executive branch that it doesn't have unlimited power
under the Constitution to do whatever it thinks is necessary, even in times of war," and arguing that the
decision dampens congressional enthusiasm for legislation authorizing NSA surveillance program); Letter
from Jerrold Nadler, Member of U.S. House of Representatives, to Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney
General (July 26, 2006) (stating that Court's decision in Hamdan makes it untenable for President to rely
on inherent powers to justify NSA surveillance program), available at 7/26/06 USFEDNEWS (Westlaw).
91
Id. at 2825 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Congress … in the proper exercise of its powers as an independent branch of government."92
Perhaps the government did not challenge the UCMJ provisions at issue in Hamdan because
they leave room for the President to act as necessary in genuine national security emergencies.
UCMJ Article 36 authorizes the President, when establishing military tribunals, to depart from
the rules for courts martial if it is "impracticable" to use identical rules.93 UCMJ Article 21
obligates the President to follow the "laws of war" in the use of military tribunals, but the laws of
war, in turn, authorize the use of military tribunals "in cases of 'controlling necessity.'"94 Thus,
both statutory provisions arguably reflect that as necessary in exigent circumstances the
President has authority to depart from their otherwise applicable strictures.
Recognizing a congressionally irreducible "genuine emergency" power in the President
is supported by the Constitution's creation of a "unitary executive."95 The Constitution provided
for only one president so, in appropriate occasions, someone can act for the nation without
consulting others.96 The Framers thought a unitary executive was particularly important for
conducting foreign affairs. A unitary executive not only enables the country to speak to other
countries with one voice.97 It also ensures quick action when necessary to protect national
security.98 Too, it helps ensure the secrecy of sensitive foreign intelligence.99 Thus, the Court
92

Id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
10 U.S.C. § 836.
94
See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139-40 (1866), and explaining
that the law of war, as described in Milligan, was initially codified in UCMJ Article 15 and later in UCMJ
Article 21); see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2785 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (referring to the "inability on the
Executive's part here to satisfy the most basic precondition -- at least in the absence of specific
congressional authorization -- for establishment of military commissions: military necessity").
95
See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712-13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(discussing unitary executive); THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed. 1961) ("Decision, activity, secrecy, and d[i]spatch will generally characterize the proceedings
of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number."); Christopher
S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 19452004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005).
96
See 10 ANNALS CONG. 613 (1800) (argument of John Marshall that "the President is the sole organ of
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations").
97
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 220 ("The President is the constitutional representative of the United States
with regard to foreign nations.") (quoting 8 U.S. Senate Reports Comm. On Foreign Relations 24 (Feb.
15, 1816).
98
See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note __, at 451-52 ("Energy in the executive … is essential to the
protection of the community against foreign attacks," and an ingredient of energy is "unity"); see also
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has often referred to the President as the "sole organ" of foreign affairs.100 The "sole organ"
concept cannot, however, be stretched so far that it puts the President indefinitely above the
law. Rather, it makes sense to let the President act as the "sole organ" if -- but only so long as - it is necessary in a genuine national security emergency for him or her to so function.101
This conclusion leaves many questions unanswered. They include the questions of who
decides whether a national security emergency exists and what response is appropriate.102 As
a practical matter, the President initially must decide those questions.103 Courts, however, can
often review those decisions when they are implemented by officials other than the President

LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL W AR POWER 6 (1995) (explaining that Framers believed President should
have power to repel foreign attacks without congressional approval partly because Congress was
expected to meet only about once a year).
99
See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("The President, both
as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services
whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world."); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320
("Secrecy in respect of information gathered by [President's "confidential sources of information"] may be
highly necessary [in the "field of international relations"] and the premature disclosure of it productive of
harmful results"); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 5-7, 200-01 (Randall W. Bland
th
et al. eds. 5 ed. 1984) (citing among President's advantages over Congress in the conduct of foreign
policy the unitary nature of the Presidency, its ability to collect and maintain secrecy of relevant
information, and to act quickly); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay), supra note __, at 422 (many
who provide useful intelligence related to treaties "would rely on the secrecy of the President" but not on
that of the Senate or House of Representatives, and therefore Constitution's framers wisely provide that
President "will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may
suggest") (quoted in Robert F. Turner, Op-Ed, FISA vs. the Constitution, W ALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2005, at
A14.
100
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) ("In our system of government, the Executive
is 'the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations… .'") (quoting CurtissWright, 299 U.S. at 320); see also Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) ("[T]he
historical gloss on the 'executive Power' vested in Article II of the constitution has recognized the
president's 'vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.'") (quoting Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 610-11 (1952)); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 125
L.Ed.2d 128 (1993) (President has "unique responsibility" for the conduct of "foreign and military affairs");
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 (1972) (plurality opinion) (President
has "the lead role … in foreign policy").
101
Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 1257-58
(2004) (arguing for recognition of a constitutional principle of necessity that can even "trump specific
constitutional requirements" if necessary to "national self-preservation").
102
Cf. Paulsen, supra note __, at 1289-96 (discussing standard and identity of decision maker for
proposed constitutional principle of necessity).
103
See Martin, 25 U.S. at 31 (in determining whether to call up the state militia pursuant to statutory and
constitutional authority, the President "is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the
exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act according to his belief of the facts").
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and affect individual rights.104 Indeed, sometimes the federal courts can set aside such
decisions, as the Court's recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld shows.105 Thus, regardless of
the power the President may individually possess as a "unitary executive," he is judicially
accountable in many settings. In addition to being judicially accountable, the President is
politically accountable for his or her unilateral responses to genuine national security
emergencies, at least once those decisions become public.106
By any standard, 9/11 constituted a genuine national security emergency.107 It
accordingly empowered the President to take some immediate actions that he reasonably
thought necessary, even if those actions violated federal statutes. Suppose, for example, that
the passengers aboard United Airlines Flight 93 had not caused the plane to crash in
Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and that it had continued its suicide mission toward the U.S.
Capitol.108 Can anyone doubt that the President could have ordered the flight shot down before
it hit the Capitol, even if that order violated a federal statute?109 Similarly, suppose the
President had ordered the instant electronic monitoring of all cell phone calls to and from the
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See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 591 (Court reviewed Executive Order that recited existence of an
"emergency" that required takeover of the nation's steel mills); see also Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 176-85 (1969) (prescribing standards and procedures by which criminal defendant could
identify and seek suppression of evidence gathered through electronic surveillance for national security
purposes); cf. Martin, 25 U.S. at 32-33 (rejecting the argument that court could try the facts underlying
President's determination that emergency existed justifying the call up of the militia); Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137, 169-172 (1803) (concluding that mandamus would lie to order head of federal government
department to take action compelled by law, where failure to take the action injured individual's vested
legal rights).
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126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006)
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See Martin, 25 U.S. at 32 (danger of President's abusing statutory and constitutional authority to call
up the militia in times of emergency lay in "the frequency of elections, and the watchfulness of the
representatives of the nation," which "carry with them all the checks which can be useful to guard against
usurpation or wanton tyranny").
107
See Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks, 66 Fed Reg. 48,199
(Sept. 14, 2001) (presidential declaration of emergency).
108
See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES 10-14 (2004) (describing events leading to the crash of United Airlines Flight
93).
109
See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note __, at 37, 45 (discussing contingent "shootdown order"
issued for Flight 93).
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plane to determine the plane's target and those responsible for the suicide mission. Would not
the President have authority to order that surveillance even if it violated FISA?110
One basis for concluding that the President would have that authority is to interpret FISA
(and other statutes limiting the President's power in genuine emergencies) implicitly to include
exceptions for genuine emergencies. That interpretation finds support in the canon requiring
courts to avoid statutory interpretations that produce "absurd results."111 But the canon should
not obscure the reason why it would be absurd to interpret FISA to prohibit the President from
responding to genuine national security emergencies: It is absurd to give Congress such a
prohibitory power. To the contrary, common sense and precedent support recognition of
presidential power, irreducible by Congress, to make necessary, immediate responses to
genuine national security emergencies.
Of course, the President's "genuine emergency" power has limits. The Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor created a "genuine emergency," but that emergency did not last for the entire
war.112 Nor did the attack on Pearl Harbor necessarily justify every measure that the President
deemed reasonable, including the mass internment of Japanese Americans.113 The existence
110

Cf. Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of former CIA Director James
Woolsey) (stating that President's "inherent authority" justifies NSA surveillance program "because the
country has been invaded -- albeit, of course, not occupied -- and defending against invasion was at the
heart of the president's Article 2 authority for the founders").
111
See, e.g., Clinton, 524 U.S. at 429. Supporting the interpretation described in the text is a statement
by then-Attorney General Griffin Bell that the bill enacted as FISA "does not take away the power [of] the
President under the Constitution.” Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings on
H.R.5764, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the House
Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 15 (1978).
112
See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 80 (1866) ("As necessity creates the rule [allowing military tribunals
to serve the function of civil courts when the latter are closed due to foreign invasion or civil war], so it
limits its duration."); id. at 127 (martial law justified only by "actual and present" necessity as in a genuine
invasion that closes civilian courts); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 113 (1943)
(Murphy, J., concurring) ("[T]he military arm, confronted with the peril of imminent enemy attack and
acting under the authority conferred by Congress, made an allowable judgment at the time the curfew
restriction [upon Japanese Americans living in certain areas of the West Coast] was imposed. Whether
such a restriction is valid today is another matter.").
113
See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102 (upholding executive order, ratified by Congress, imposing curfew
on Japanese Americans in certain areas during World War II, while emphasizing that other wartime
measures affecting Japanese Americans (such as internment) were not before the Court); see also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1945) (upholding Executive Order excluding
Japanese Americans from certain areas).
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of genuine emergency powers in the President -- and the relaxation of Bill-of-Rights limits on
those powers -- must be limited in time and scope.114 Otherwise, the separation of powers
system cannot work effectively and Bill of Rights freedoms become fair weather friends. I
propose two limits on the President's "genuine emergency" powers.
First, the President's power depends on the legislative framework within which it is
exercised. The President can defy an Act of Congress in a national security emergency only if
defiance of the legislation is necessary to respond to the emergency. If the President can
effectively respond to the emergency while obeying the statute, the President lacks power to
defy it.115 Thus, Congress can regulate the President's power to respond to national security
emergencies by enacting legislation that gives the President adequate leeway in such
emergencies. By the same token, it is the inadequacy of legislation that justifies presidential
defiance of the legislation in cases of genuine emergency.116
Second, the President's emergency powers are residual when Congress has enacted
generally valid legislation in the same area. Congress and the President share power in many
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Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("The judicial test of
whether the Government, on a plea of military necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of his
constitutional rights is whether the deprivation is reasonably related to a public danger that is so
'immediate, imminent, and impending' as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of
ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger.").
115
The President has claimed that the NSA surveillance program is "crucial to our national security."
Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Sen. Pat Roberts et al. 1 (Dec. 22, 2005) ("The President has stated that these activities are
'crucial to our national security.'"), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj122205.pdf. The
President has not (publicly, at least) shown why it is necessary to ignore FISA in conducting that
program.
116
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
th
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94 Cong. 92 (1976) (testimony
of Attorney General Edward H. Levi) ("[]W]hen a statute prescribes a method of domestic [surveillance]
action adequate to the President's duty to protect the national security, the President is legally obliged to
follow it.") (emphasis added); see also Senate Hearing of Mar. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (prepared
statement of David S. Kris, Senior Vice President, Time Warner, Inc.) (separation of powers analysis of
NSA program will depend partly on "the [executive branch's] need to eschew the use of FISA in obtaining"
needed information); cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 58 & 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that federal courts have inherent and congressionally "indefeasible" power to "do what courts
have traditionally done in order to accomplish their assigned tasks," and, while Congress "may to some
degree" prescribe the means for exercising that power, courts can ignore the prescribed congressionally
prescribed means if those means are inadequate); id. at 65 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (positing a similar
"necessity limitation" on federal courts' exercise of congressionally irreducible inherent powers).
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areas, including the waging of war.117 In matters of shared governance, the separation of
powers doctrine gives Congress the power to make rules and the President power -- not to
unmake Congress's rules -- but to break them when reasonably necessary in a genuine
emergency. For example, in late 2005 Congress enacted a law prohibiting members of the
armed forces from torturing people detained in the war on terrorism.118 Assume for the sake of
argument that it is possible to conceive of a "genuine emergency" in which the President could
reasonably decide it was necessary to defy this prohibition.119 It is one thing to recognize
presidential power to break Congress's rule in a particularly exigent situation, after making an
individualized determination that it was necessary to violate the prohibition. It is quite a different
matter to recognize presidential power to unmake Congress's rule by promulgating a "program"
authorizing torture in broadly defined categories of situations.120 One way to express the
difference is by saying that, in the second situation, the President is impermissibly exercising
legislative power, whereas in the first situation he is exercising irreducible executive power.121
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Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (discussing Constitution's grants of war powers to President and
Congress); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93 ("[T]he Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress
the exercise of the war power… ."); see also, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, 126 S.
Ct. 1297, 1306 (2006) (("'[J]udicial deference … is at its apogee' when Congress legislates under its
authority to raise and support armies.") (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
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Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (Dec. 30, 2005)
("No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless
of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment.").
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To be clear, I am indeed staking out the position that the President has power to ignore anti-torture
legislation when reasonably necessary to respond to a genuine national security emergency. Although
the President's power in this regard is not congressionally irreducible, it is, of course, subject to
constitutional restrictions, such as those imposed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. See
Richard H. Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. ___ (forthcoming summer 2006) (discussing
constitutional limits on government's power to torture suspected terrorists); see also Paulsen, supra note
__, at 1280 (taking a similar position). Furthermore, even if Congress lacks power to prohibit executive
branch torture in certain situations, Congress might have power to exclude evidence derived from that
torture in federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992) (stating in dicta that
Congress could require disclosure to criminal defendants of exculpatory evidence presented to the grand
jury, even if Constitution did not require disclosure).
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See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 ("[T]he President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.").
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The President's power in the legislative process, as specifically prescribed in the Constitution, includes
recommending legislation to Congress. Certainly the President could have done so in the 4 year since
first authorizing the NSA program. See Dan Eggen, 2003 Draft Legislation Covered Eavesdropping,
Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 2006, at A2 (observing that Department of Justice drafted legislation in 2003 to
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Another way to express the difference is to say that the executive power to act in "emergencies"
is limited in scope and duration to that necessary when there is "no time for deliberation."122
Those limits flow from our system of separated powers.
B. Fourth Amendment Constraints on Presidential Powers in a "Genuine Emergency"
The hypothetical surveillance order described above, covering all cell phone calls to and
from the doomed Flight 93, falls not only within the intrinsic limits of the President's powers
under Article II but also within the extrinsic limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment.123
Ordinarily, the Fourth Amendment requires the government to get a warrant before
electronically intercepting phone calls.124 In addition, the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires
a particularized showing that the monitoring of each phone user is likely to reveal evidence of

amend Patriot Act but, according to Justice Department officials, the draft legislation did not address the
NSA program).
122
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-29, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 036696) (Justice Souter remarks, "[I]t may well be that the executive has power in the early exigencies of an
emergency. But that at some point in the indefinite future, the other political branch has got to act if that
… power is to continue."); JOHN HART ELY, W AR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 5-9 (1993) (proposing that, in response to sudden attack, President can
respond without congressional authorization if he seeks such authorization simultaneously); William C.
Bradford, "The Duty to Defend Them: A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1448 (2004) ("[I]n the event of an invasion or other imminent harm against
U.S. citizens or property, inherent presidential powers of self-defense -- for the exercise of which the
President need neither seek nor receive congressional authorization -- are triggered, even if the President
remains obligated to make a subsequent request for congressional authorization for his course of
action.") (footnote omitted); John W. Dean, George W. Bush as the New Richard M. Nixon: Both
Wiretapped Illegally, and Impeachably; Both Claimed That a President May Violate Congress' Laws to
Protect National Security, FindLaw (Dec. 30, 2005) (stating that NSA surveillance program might have
been justified "as a temporary measure" or in response to "a particularly serious threat of attack," but
program is not justified considering all of the time that President has had, and not used, "to seek legal
authority for his action" from Congress), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20051230.html; cf. Mitchell v.
Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 134 (1851) (for military to have power to take private property for military use, "the
danger must be immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent for the public service, such as will not
admit of delay, and where the action of the civil authority would be too late in providing the means which
the occasion calls for").
123
See generally, e.g., David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial
Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 79 ("Intrinsic limits derive from the principle of enumerated powers."); id. at
153 (describing Bill of Rights as containing "extrinsic limits").
124
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 758 (1971) ("We held in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 ...
[(1967)] that wiretapping is a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and
therefore must meet its requirements, viz., there must be a prior showing of probable cause, the warrant
authorizing the wiretap must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized, and that it may not have the breadth, generality, and long life of the general warrant against
which the Fourth Amendment was aimed.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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crime.125 The traditional Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant and an individualized
showing of probable cause for a search do not, however, apply to our Flight 93 scenario. The
exigent circumstances doctrine of Fourth Amendment law justifies immediate, warrantless
surveillance of all cell phone users on board the flight.126 Moreover, although the exigent
circumstances doctrine normally requires a particularized showing of probable cause of criminal
activity,127 that showing is unnecessary when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement," makes the probable cause requirement impracticable.128 The Flight 93 scenario
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See id.
See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (holding that police's warrantless entry into
home and search for bank robber did not violate the Fourth Amendment because "the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Georgia v. Randolph,
126 S. Ct. 1515, 1524 n.6 (2006) (stating in dicta that exigent circumstances would justify police's entry
into a house, over the objection of a co-tenant, when necessary to preserve evidence or in other
circumstances); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 649-50 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion of
Wright, J., joined by Chief Judges Bazelon and Circuit Judges Leventhal and Spottswood W. Robinson,
III) (finding that exigent circumstances doctrine would allow warrantless electronic surveillance when
delay would cause "disastrous harm to the national security")
127
See, e.g., Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307.
128
See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). As the text indicates, the exigent circumstances doctrine
and the "special needs" doctrine sometimes overlap. The overlap occurs when exigent circumstances,
such as those associated with national security emergencies, trigger a "special need" for searches and
seizures beyond that associated with ordinary law enforcement. Two recent Supreme Court cases
confirm the overlap. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000), the Supreme Court relied
on the exigent circumstances doctrine in stating that "the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly
permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a
dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route." The Court explained that each of
these situations would involve an "emergency" that would cause the "primary purpose" of such a
roadblock no longer to be merely "ordinary crime control." Id.; see also id. (stating that the "exigencies
created by" the terrorist scenario "are far removed from the circumstances under which authorities might
simply stop cars as a matter of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the jurisdiction").
In support of that dicta, the Court cited the decision of the court of appeals in Edmond, which had
endorsed roadblocks for similar purposes but relied, not on the exigent circumstances doctrine, but on the
th
"special needs" doctrine of Fourth Amendment law. See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 662-63 (7
Cir. 1999) (cited in Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44). We see similar blending of the exigent circumstances
doctrine and the special needs doctrine in dissenting opinions in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
The majority in Caballes held that the use of a narcotics-detection dog during a traffic stop did not
constitute a "search" or "seizure" subject to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 407-10. In dissent, Justice
Souter said that he "would treat the dog sniff" as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 84243 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted, however -- in discussing the government's "authority to
detect explosives and dangerous chemical or biological weapons that might be carried by a terrorist who
prompts no individualized suspicion" -- that "[u]nreasonable sniff searches for marijuana are not
necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or deadly material if suicide bombs are a risk." Id.
at 843 n.7. Justice Souter did not identify what Fourth Amendment doctrine supported the
reasonableness of sniff searches for suicide bombs. Fellow dissenter Justice Ginsburg, however,
identified the special needs doctrine as supporting both the suicide-bomb scenario described by Justice
126
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thus illustrates the overlap between the President's congressionally irreducible, intrinsic power
under Article II to respond to genuine national security emergencies and extrinsic limits on that
power imposed by the Fourth Amendment. In a "genuine emergency," the President can take
immediate action reasonably necessary to protect national security -- even if the action violates
statutory restrictions -- and, if the President's action entails a search or seizure (as does
presidentially authorized electronic surveillance), exigent circumstances will often excuse
ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements. In short, the President's power reasonably to
respond to a genuine national security emergency not only is irreducible by Congress but also
satisfies the Fourth Amendment -- even if the response entails warrantless, suspicionless
searches and seizures -- as long as that response is reasonably justified by the emergency.129
The overlap between separation of powers limits and Fourth Amendment limits on the
President's power in the Flight 93 scenario is not happenstance. Rather, it reflects an overlap
Souter and the terrorist scenario described by the majority (and justified using the exigent circumstances
doctrine) in Edmond. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 424-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Kia P. v.
nd
McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 762 (2 Cir. 2000) (holding that state's seizure of a child in order to prevent
suspected abuse or neglect could be justified under either the special needs or the exigent circumstances
doctrine). In the absence of a genuine national security exigency, even routine protection of national
security may justify some types of special needs searches, including ones that occur at the border. See
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (warrantless, suspicionless border searches
supported by "the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself") (quoting United States v. Ramsey,
431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (border
searches supported by "Congress' power to protect the nation"); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
154 (1925) ("Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self
protection… ."). Without extended discussion, I would only note that, in my view, neither the special
needs doctrine nor the border search doctrine, standing alone, support the current NSA surveillance
program as a whole. The special needs doctrine does not work because of the scope and intrusiveness
of the surveillance program; if it passes muster under special needs analysis, just about anything goes -the Fourth Amendment would be gutted. Essentially the same analysis precludes reliance on the border
search doctrine. The NSA surveillance program monitors calls and emails between foreign countries and
places throughout the United States. Because the surveillance blankets this country, if it is treated as
occurring at the border or its "functional equivalent," the border search doctrine would decimate the
Fourth Amendment. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973) (stating that
border searches "may in certain circumstances take place not only at the border itself, but at its functional
equivalent as well," such as "a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis
airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City"); see also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 892-93
(1975) (government did not attempt to treat search occurring at fixed checkpoint more than 60 miles from
the border as occurring at the "functional equivalent" of the border).
129
As Chris Slobogin has pointed out, the term "suspicionless" is often used imprecisely to refer to
situations that are, in fact, suspicious but that may not involve suspicion associated with any particular
individual. See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57,
81-85 (1991).
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between the separation of powers doctrine and Fourth Amendment doctrine.130 Our system of
separated powers provides a unitary executive to encourage prompt and focused exercises of
executive power, especially in foreign affairs.131 Yet to prevent abuses of executive power,
separation of powers requires the President to obey limits imposed in statutes enacted by
Congress (while acting within its powers) and in judgments entered by the federal courts (while
acting within their powers). The Fourth Amendment, like the separation of powers doctrine, is
designed to prevent abuses of power by any of the three branches. Thus, both the separation
of powers and the Fourth Amendment are power-limiting provisions neither of which speaks in
absolutes. In a genuine national security emergency, the President needs some room to act
unilaterally -- even in defiance of congressional restrictions -- and without the usual Fourth
Amendment constraints. Recognition of this unilateral emergency power reflects that neither
the separation of powers doctrine nor the Fourth Amendment operates as a "suicide pact."132
As is true of presidential power to ignore generally valid statutes, presidential power to
act free of ordinary Fourth Amendment constraints has limits. Specifically, a search that is
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See Keith, 407 U.S. at 317 (the Fourth Amendment principle that generally requires advance judicial
approval of searches "accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be
preserved through a separation of powers"); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, (1967)
(Douglas, J. concurring) ("In matters where [the President or Attorney General] believe national security
may be involved they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be.
Under the separation of powers …, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and
disinterested… I cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth
Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the position of
adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate."); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders'
Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325,
1342 (2002) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment and the doctrine of separation of powers share the same goal
and are intended to serve the same function" -- namely, "to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power."); cf.
Timothy Lynch, In Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 711, 737 (2000) (arguing
that "[t]he exclusionary rule can be justified on the basis of separation of powers principles").
131
See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text
132
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). On this same "Constitution is not a suicide
pact" principle, one can imagine other instances -- besides the exigent circumstances situation -- in which
the President might have plenary power to act free of statutory limitations and, at the same time, free of
ordinary constitutional constraints. I thank David Kris for this point. See E-mail from David S. Kris, Senior
Vice-President & Deputy General Counsel and Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer, Time Warner, Inc.,
to Richard Henry Seamon, Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law (July 12, 2006 8:49 AM)
(on file with author); see also Paulsen, supra note __, at 1257 (proposing an "overriding principle of
constitutional and national self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule of construction and that may
even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific constitutional requirements").
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justified at its inception by exigent circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment if conducted in
a way that is not reasonably related to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.133 And
so, police officers who enter a house without a warrant to help a shooting victim cannot stay in
the house to search for evidence of crime after they have rendered the help.134 Likewise, a wide
scale surveillance program that violates an existing statute but that is justified by a national
emergency such as 9/11 becomes unjustified as days and weeks pass without further attacks
and give the executive branch an opportunity to have Congress consider whether to amend the
statute to allow the program.135
C.

Summary

I want to summarize by emphasizing the limited nature of my claim. I claim that
precedent suggests that the President has congressionally irreducible power to respond
reasonably to respond to genuine national security emergencies. Precedent is suggestive but
not conclusive on the existence of this plenary power. Equally important, the precedent
suggests the President's "genuine emergency" powers, if any, are limited in scope and duration
when Congress has legislated on a matter as to which it and the President share power. In their
interstitial nature, the President's powers resemble, and indeed often parallel, the government's
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See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ('[A] warrantless
search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation ….") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
134
See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (approving lower court cases holding that "the Fourth Amendment does
not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a
person within is in need of immediate aid," but these holdings did not justify four-day search of murder
scene that occurred in the case before the Court).
135
In commenting on a draft of this article, Louis Fisher asked the fair question how long after 9/11 the
President's power to defy FISA lasted. E-mail from Louis Fisher, supra note __. Lincoln acted in April
1861 and didn't address Congress until it returned several months later. He notes that, when President
Lincoln waited until several months after Congress returned from recess to seek legislation authorizing
Lincoln's emergency actions (including suspension of the writ of habeas corpus) in April 1861. Id.; see
also Fisher, supra note __, at 260-61. I agree with the standard that Dr. Fisher proposes: When
Congress is in session, the President must go to Congress as soon as possible. In the case of 9/11, that
date came less than one week after 9/11, for that is how quickly the Administration was able to draft and
present to Congress the bill later enacted as the Patriot Act. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note __, at 328;
see also Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the Judiciary Comm. of the
th
House of Representatives, 107 Cong. 67-90 (Sept. 24, 2001) (reproducing Administration's proposed
bill).
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power under "exigent circumstances" to conduct searches and seizures free from the traditional
Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant and individualized probable cause.136 The
parallel reflects the pragmatic balance between strong executive power and safeguards against
executive abuses that underlie both separation of powers doctrine and Fourth Amendment
doctrine.
III.

Analysis of the NSA Program As an Exercise of the President's Genuine National
Security Emergency Powers
A.

Whether the NSA Program Falls Within the President's Power Even Though the
Program Violates FISA

As discussed above, precedent suggests that the President has congressionally
irreducible power to take immediate action reasonably necessary to respond to a genuine
national security emergency; that power is limited, however, by the legislative framework within
which it is exercised and by its exigent nature. The current NSA program exceeds those limits.
Let us assume that in the days and weeks after the 9/11 attacks the President could
have established a "program" of domestic, electronic surveillance outside FISA. The
President's power to maintain such a program, which violated a facially valid statute, subsided
as weeks passed without further attacks and provided "time for deliberation"137 within a system
of civilian government that continued to function.138 Indeed, deliberations on appropriate
responses to 9/11 did occur within and among the executive branch and Congress. The result
was enactment of the PATRIOT Act, which expanded surveillance power by, among other
136

Thus, I am not making the argument that a court recently understood the government to be making in
defense of the NSA program; I do not argue that the President "has been granted the inherent power to
violate not only the laws of the Congress but [also] the … Fourth Amendment." ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL
2371463, at *25.
137
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552.
138
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 80 (1866) (stating that military tribunals could "furnish a substitute for the
civil authority" if "in foreign invasion or civil war, the [civil] courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to
administer criminal justice according to law"); cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006)
(opinion of Breyer, J., concurring) (rejecting dissent's argument that Court's decision invalidating
Presidential order establishing military tribunals threatened national security: "Where, as here, no
emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not
weaken our Nation's ability to deal with danger.").
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changes, amendments to FISA.139 It is hard for the President to argue it was reasonably
necessary to establish a far-ranging surveillance "program" in defiance of FISA when the
President did not first attempt to change FISA to avoid the need to violate that statute.140
True, FISA has shortcomings. The shortcomings reflect changes in surveillance
technology and in international terrorism. Those shortcomings could very well justify
surveillance outside FISA -- even today -- if the President reasonably determines that, in a
particular instance, it is reasonably necessary to depart from FISA. Specifically, FISA may have
three shortcomings that could create "genuine emergencies" justifying event-specific departures
from FISA.
First, it may take too long to get a FISA surveillance order.141 True, the Attorney General
can authorize "emergency orders" approving FISA surveillance without prior court approval.142

139

United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 206-208, 214, 215, 218 & 225, 115 Stat. 272, 282-83, 28788, 291, 295-96 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
140
See supra note __ and accompanying text (arguing that President had power to act only while there
was no time for deliberation). One argument that the President has made is that the terrorists might have
been alerted if the President had consulted with Congress about the NSA surveillance program. This
argument is difficult to analyze because so little relevant information is publicly available. I do not wish to
reject the argument out of hand, however.
141
The DOJ White Paper, supra note __, at 18, summarizes the typical FISA process:
As a general matter, the statute requires that the Attorney General approve an
application for an order from a special court composed of Article III judges and created by
FISA—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”). See 50 U.S.C. §§ 18031804. The application must demonstrate, among other things, that there is probable
cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. See id.
§ 1805(a)(3)(A). It must also contain a certification from the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs or an officer of the United States appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate and having responsibilities in the area of national
security or defense that the information sought is foreign intelligence information and
cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative means. See id. § 1804(a)(7).
FISA further requires the Government to state the means that it proposes to use to obtain
the information and the basis for its belief that the facilities at which the surveillance will
be directed are being used or are about to be used by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power. See id. § 1804(a)(4), (a)(8).
142

50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) ("Emergency orders") provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the Attorney General
reasonably determines that --
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But this statutory emergency authority has drawbacks. The Attorney General must personally
determine the existence of both an emergency exists and that the factual basis for the issuance
of an orders.143 Until he or she does so, emergency surveillance cannot occur.144 NSA,
however, may need to start surveillance the instant that NSA determines the surveillance is
justified, without waiting for Attorney General authorization.145 Furthermore, the Attorney
General is only one person, and he or she may be called upon personally and very quickly to
make dozens or hundreds of "emergency" determinations. The Attorney General could become
a bottleneck. Finally, the government must advise the FISA court of each emergency order and
apply within 72 hours for a surveillance order from the court to ratify the attorney general's

(1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such
surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and
(2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this subchapter to approve such
surveillance exists;
he may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance is a judge having
jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title is informed by the Attorney General or his
designee at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ
emergency electronic surveillance and if an application in accordance with this
subchapter is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more than 72 hours after
the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance. If the Attorney General authorizes
such emergency employment of electronic surveillance, he shall require that the
minimization procedures required by this subchapter for the issuance of a judicial order
be followed. In the absence of a judicial order approving such electronic surveillance, the
surveillance shall terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the
application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of 72 hours from the time of
authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is earliest.
.
143
50 U.S.C. § 1805(f)(1) & (2); Moschella Letter of Mar. 24, 2006, supra note __, encl. at 12 (stating that
Attorney General must "personally" determine that factual basis for emergency FISA surveillance exists).
144
See Moschella Letter of Mar. 24, 2006, supra note __, encl. at 39 ("[A]s a practical matter, it is
necessary for NSA intelligence officers, NSA lawyers, Justice Department lawyers, and the Attorney
General to review a matter before even emergency surveillance would begin.").
145
See Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks at the Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 24,
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_0601241.html:
[T]he optimal way to achieve the necessary speed and agility is to leave the decisions
about particular intercepts to the judgment of professional intelligence officers, based on
the best available intelligence information. They can make that call quickly. If, however,
those same intelligence officers had to navigate through the FISA process for each of
these intercepts, that would necessarily introduce a significant factor of DELAY, and
there would be critical holes in our early warning system.
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emergency order.146 This supposedly expedited application process, required for every
emergency order, could keep dozens of government lawyers employed on a continual fire drill
without coming close to achieving the instantaneous authorization that is sometimes required for
national security surveillance.
Second, the standards for getting FISA surveillance orders may be too high. NSA
monitors phone calls and emails into and out of the United States involving people whom NSA
has a "reasonable basis" for believing are associated with al Qaeda.147 These people may not
be "agents of foreign power" who can be targeted under FISA.148 Indeed, the person in the
United States whose phone calls or emails are monitored may be entirely innocent, if it is the
person outside the U.S. who is associated with al Qaeda and who triggers NSA surveillance.149
To cite another example, perhaps the person in the U.S. who is being monitored is associated
with al Qaeda but the association does not make that person a foreign agent.150 Even so, the
government may have good reason to monitor the communication.
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50 U.S.C. § 1805(f).
See DOJ White Paper, supra note __, at 5 ("[T]he Attorney General [has] elaborated and explained
that in order to intercept a communication, there must be 'a reasonable basis to conclude that one party
to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization
affiliated with al Qaeda.' Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael
Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html (Dec. 19, 2005) (statement of
Attorney General Gonzales).").
148
50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (defining "agent of a foreign power"); see also id. § 1805(a)(3) (requiring judge to
find "probable cause" that target of proposed FISA surveillance "is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power").
149
Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of former CIA Director James
Woolsey) ("Suppose Al Qaida calls someone in the united States, and it's a false flag operation, and they
pretend to be Hezbollah to get him to do something. Are they an agent -- is that probable cause to
believe they're an agent of Al Qaida? I don't think so."); Douglas Waller, A Better Way to Eavesdrop?,
TIME, Feb. 2, 2006 (quoting "administration official" as stating that "you have this amorphous group of
people around the world who are all calling people in the U.S. You may not know who they're calling in
the U.S., but you know the person making the call is a bad guy. … But FISA doesn't fit that situation.");
Richard A. Posner, Wire Trap, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 2006, at 15 (NSA program is apparently designed
to fill gap left by FISA "by conducting warrantless interceptions of communications in which one party is in
the United States … and the other party is abroad and suspected of being a terrorist.").
150
See Seamon & Gardner, supra note __, at 345 (footnotes omitted):
147

[FISA] classifies a U.S. person as a foreign agent based on their "knowing" involvement,
"for or on behalf of a foreign power," in (1) "'clandestine intelligence gathering activities'
[that] involve or may involve violations of Federal criminal law'; (2) "other clandestine
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Third, FISA orders could be too narrow. FISA authorizes surveillance of one target at a
time.151 The government, however, sometimes needs to conduct wholesale surveillance -- for
example, by monitoring phone calls to all persons in the United States from particular individuals
outside the U.S.152 Wholesale surveillance may very well violate FISA but be reasonably
necessary in a genuine national security emergency, such as when the government has strong
evidence that someone outside the U.S. is planning terrorist attacks on a U.S. target with
accomplices inside the U.S.153

intelligence activities," "pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power," "which … involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal
statutes of the United States"; (3) "sabotage or international terrorism [as defined
elsewhere in the FISA] … or activities that are in preparation therefore"; (4) entering or
remaining in the United States "under a false or fraudulent identity" or (5) aiding or
abetting, or conspiring to engage in, any of the first three categories of activities listed in
this sentence. Thus, to find probable cause that a U.S. person is an "agent of a foreign
power," the judge usually must find evidence of conduct that is a crime or likely to be a
crime.
See also McCarthy, supra note __, at 90 (referring to the "relatively narrow portion of the overall al
Qaeda-related communications" covered by FISA); Posner, supra note __, at 16 ("[T]he problem with fisa
is that the surveillance it authorizes is unusable to discover who is a terrorist, as distinct from
eavesdropping on known terrorists …. Even to conduct fisa-compliant surveillance of non-U.S. persons,
you have to know beforehand whether they are agents of a terrorist group, when what you really want to
know is who those agents are.").
151
Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of former CIA Director James
Woolsey) ("The one spy at a time surveillance systems of the Cold War, including FISA, through courts,
are not designed to deal with fast-moving battlefield electronic mapping -- in which an Al Qaida or a
Hezbollah computer might be captured which contains a large number of e-mail addresses and phone
numbers which would have to be checked out very promptly. An attorney general, on a 72-hour basis or
a FISA court, simply cannot go through the steps that are set out … in time to deal with this type of
situation").
152
See Posner, supra note __, at 16 (surveillance would run up against FISA if government domestically
monitored all international phone calls to a phone number in the United States that was discovered once
to have been called by a terrorist suspect abroad, or if government, more broadly, used computers
domestically to scan all electronic communications for suspicious messages); K. A. Taipale, Whispering
Wires and Warrantless Wiretaps: Data Mining and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SECURITY, No. VII Supl. Bull. on L. & Sec.: The NSA and the War on Terror, at 4-6 (Spring 2006)
(discussing need for automated, programmatic surveillance of electronic communications' contents and
traffic patterns), available at http://whisperingwires.info/.
153
The government can also avoid FISA by conducting electronic surveillance that falls outside FISA's
definition of "electronic surveillance." The definition does not, for example, cover surveillance of a "United
States person" if the surveillance is conducted outside the United States and does not "intentionally
target[] that United States person." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). Thus, the government would not be subject to
FISA if it targeted persons who are located abroad -- even U.S. persons -- if the surveillance occurs
abroad. If conducted inside the United States, however, the surveillance would be subject to FISA. See
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2) (defining "electronic surveillance" to include, with an exception not pertinent here,
"the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or
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In sum, the President may have power to authorize surveillance "outside FISA" in
situations presenting a "genuine emergency." That power, however, exists only when national
security exigencies make it reasonably necessary to ignore FISA. Even so, the power justifies
surveillance outside FISA even today, to the extent FISA's shortcomings create exigent
circumstances precluding resort to the FISA process. This residual power does not support the
current NSA surveillance "program," which authorizes wholesale departure from FISA.
B.

Whether the NSA Program Violates the Fourth Amendment
Because Surveillance Under the Program Occurs Without a Warrant or
Traditional Probable Cause

Before Congress enacted FISA in 1978, several lower federal courts upheld warrantless
electronic surveillance conducted for national security purposes.154 Those courts interpreted the
Fourth Amendment to create an exception to the warrant requirement for searches conducted
for foreign intelligence purposes.155 The government has relied on these cases to argue that the
current NSA program of domestic surveillance does not violate the Fourth Amendment even
though it occurs without a warrant or probable cause to believe the surveillance will reveal
evidence of crime.156 Opponents of the current NSA program counter that these cases are

radio communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if
such acquisition occurs in the United States"); see also NSA Debate: Federalist Society: Rivkin v. Levy
(posted on Jan. 23, 2006) (remark by David Rivkin), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1563282/posts.
154
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742 ("[A]ll the other courts to have decided the issue [have] held that the
President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence
th
information."); see United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4 Cir. 1980) ("[T]he Executive
Branch need not always obtain a warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance."); United States v. Butenko,
rd
494 F.2d 593, 606 (3 Cir. 1974) (en banc) ("[A] warrant prior to a search is not an absolute prerequisite
in the foreign intelligence field when the President has authorized surveillance"); United States v. Brown,
th
484 F.2d 418, 426 (5 Cir. 1973) ("[T]he President may constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence."). But cf. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 613-14 (plurality opinion of
Wright, J.) (stating in dicta, "[A]n analysis of the policies implicated by foreign security surveillance
indicates that, absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless surveillance is unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional."); see also id. at 651 ("[O]ur analysis would suggest that, absent exigent circumstances,
no wiretapping in the area of foreign affairs should be exempt from prior judicial scrutiny, irrespective of
the justification for the surveillance or the importance of the information sought.").
155
See, e.g., Truong, 629 F.2d at 913 ("For several reasons, the needs of the executive are so compelling
in the area of foreign intelligence … that a uniform warrant requirement would … unduly frustrate the
President in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
156
See, e.g., DOJ White Paper, supra note __, at 8 ("[E]very federal appellate court to rule on the
question has concluded that, even in peacetime, the President has inherent constitutional authority,
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inapposite because they concern surveillance conducted before FISA was enacted.157 Thus,
the opponents believe that FISA's enactment affects Fourth Amendment analysis. Neither
opponents nor supporters of the NSA program, however, elaborate on how FISA affects Fourth
Amendment analysis. This portion of the article examines that issue. I believe that FISA
influences any Fourth Amendment analysis of the NSA program and should carry particular
weight in the courts' analysis of the program.
First, it changes the legal landscape within which the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness of the NSA program will be judged.158 Prior to FISA, the alternative to
conducting electronic surveillance for national security purposes without a warrant was to seek
a warrant for a physical search using the warrant application process used by prosecutors to
search for evidence of crime.159 That process caused problems because it was designed for
physical searches, not electronic surveillance, and for criminal investigations, not for national
security surveillance.160 With the ordinary criminal warrant process as an alternative,
warrantless national security surveillance might have been reasonable. Warrantless
surveillance is not necessarily reasonable when the alternative to it is the FISA process that
Congress engineered with electronic surveillance and national security in mind. Thus,
experience under FISA could establish that the current NSA program is unreasonable, and
therefore violates the Fourth Amendment, even though the same program might have been
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct searches for foreign intelligence purposes without
securing a judicial warrant.").
157
See, e.g., ABA Task Force Report on NSA Surveillance, supra note __, at 13 (observing, in response
to government's reliance on pre-FISA case law, that "FISA was enacted precisely because, prior to FISA,
prior presidents had repeatedly abused" their power).
158
See, e.g., Samson v. California, 2006 WL 1666974 (June 19, 2006) ("[U]nder our general Fourth
Amendment approach, we examin[e] the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a search is
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
159
See generally, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (governing process for federal law enforcement officers and
government attorneys to get search warrants).
160
See Truong, 629 F.2d at 913-15 (decision involving pre-FISA surveillance holding that "because of the
need of the executive branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional competence, the
courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign surveillance");
Amicus Memo at 42, In re Warrantless Electronic Surveillance, supra note __ (arguing that the concerns
identified in Truong are largely alleviated by FISA, including its creation of a specialized court with
procedures for expedited consideration of applications for surveillance orders).
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reasonable prior to FISA. In short, determining whether warrantless NSA surveillance is
reasonable requires a consideration of the alternatives. FISA has created an alternative that,
experience show, facilitates the process of getting judicial approval for national security
surveillance. Thus, the existence of FISA and experience under the FISA bears on the
reasonableness of proceeding without resort to that process in somewhat the same way as
rules authorizing telephonic warrants bears on the reasonableness of police proceeding without
a warrant.161
So, too, the existence of FISA bears on Fourth Amendment analysis in essentially the
same way as it bears on separation of powers analysis. To the extent that FISA provides a
process adequate for conducting surveillance in a genuine national security emergency, the
government's failure to use that process is unreasonable. To the same extent, the failure to use
that process cannot be justified by the President's congressionally irreducible power to violate a
statute when reasonably necessary to respond to a genuine national security emergency.162
FISA would thus be relevant to any Fourth Amendment analysis of the NSA program.
For three additional reasons, it deserves particular weight in judicial analysis of the program.
First, FISA generally falls within Congress's power to regulate domestic surveillance for
foreign intelligence information. That power comes from the Commerce Clause, to the extent
that the surveillance involves interception of information that travels through channels of
interstate or foreign commerce such as telephone lines.163 Additional power flows from
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See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) (observing that the inconvenience of
obtaining a warrant to arrest a suspect in a third party's home is "simply not that significant" because of,
among other reasons, availability of telephonic warrants); cf. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[E]ven if a 'frisk' prior to arrest would have been impermissible in 1791
[when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted], … perhaps it is only since that time that concealed
weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm's reach have become
common -- which might alter the judgment of what is 'reasonable' under the original standard.").
162
See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
163
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381-85 (1937) (construing
federal statute to bar federal agents from divulging communications intercepted by telephone taps;
supposing that Congress enacted the statute to enforce "the guaranty against practices and procedures
violative of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution"); see also supra
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congressional powers associated with war and foreign affairs as amplified by the Necessary and
Proper Clause.164 Indeed, the executive branch has never questioned that FISA generally falls
within Congress's power, except to the extent that it infringes on the President's congressionally
irreducible power under the Constitution.165
Second, FISA not only falls within Congress's power but also represents Congress's
careful attempt to enforce the Fourth Amendment.166 Congress considered foreign intelligence

notes __-__ and accompanying text (discussing Congress's power to regulate executive's gathering of
foreign intelligence).
164
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 10-16, 18.
165
See Seamon & Gardner, supra note __, at 337 n.70 (citing legislative history); see also Keith, 407 U.S.
at 338 n.2 ("[T]he United States does not claim that Congress is powerless to require warrants for
surveillances that the President otherwise would not be barred by the Fourth Amendment from
undertaking without a warrant."). In commenting on a draft of this article, Judge Posner observed that -unlike Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to pass laws applicable to the
states enforcing substantive constitutional provisions, "[t]here is no corresponding authorization for
Congress to pass laws enforcing … the Fourth Amendment" against the federal government. E-mail from
Judge Posner, supra note __. In my view Congress does have power – under the Necessary and Proper
Clause -- legislatively to prescribe its judgments on Fourth Amendment reasonableness when Congress
is regulating federal officials’ enforcement (execution) of laws that Congress enacted under other
enumerated powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 18 (empowering Congress to enact laws necessary
and proper "for carrying into Execution" not only other legislative powers but, in addition, "all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the united States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof"). When Congress in the FISA authorized federal agents to conduct foreign intelligence
surveillance, Congress was entitled to limit this authority -- granted by Congress itself -- in a way that, in
Congress's judgment, corresponded to Fourth Amendment limits. Cf. Thomas C. Berg, The
Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 715, 728-38 (1998)
(making a similar point with respect to Congress's power to enforce Free Exercise Clause against federal
government's actions). Granted, Congress's ability to limit the scope of its own grants of power to federal
law enforcement agents differs from Congress's ability to limit the scope of the President's exercise of his
or her constitutional powers through executive branch agents. Precisely because of that difference, I
argue in this article that FISA violates the separation of powers doctrine if FISA is construed to prevent
the President from taking action necessary in response to a genuine national security emergency.
Congress cannot infringe on the President's inherent, congressionally irreducible power to respond to
genuine national security emergencies even when Congress seeks to enforce what it regards as
restrictions compelled by the Fourth Amendment. A power in Congress to enforce the Fourth
Amendment outside the plenary presidential power is a power to enforce, not a power to define, the
substance of the Fourth Amendment. But Congress’s exercise of this enforcement power should affect
judicial analysis of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, at least when Congress so carefully considers
Fourth Amendment concerns as did the Congress that enacted FISA. The resulting legislation supplies
important evidence on both the governmental interests and the privacy interests that underlie
reasonableness analysis. This conclusion finds support in the case law cited supra in note 157.
166
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-701, at 13 (1978) (bill enacted as FISA "embodies a legislative judgment
[about the] … procedural safeguards necessary to insure that electronic surveillance … conforms to the
fundamental principles of the fourth amendment"); S. REP. No. 95-604, at 7-8 (1977) (bill responded to
finding by Church Committee that prior executive branch surveillance supposedly conducted for national
security purposes "seriously infringed the fourth Amendment Rights of both the targets and those with
whom the targets communicated") (quoting Senate Comm. To Study Governmental Operations with
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surveillance for six years and held as many hearings before enacting FISA.167 Congress
devoted much of that time to crafting legislation that balanced national security needs against
Fourth Amendment concerns.168 Throughout the process, Congress consulted with the
Department of Justice.169 FISA may not be perfect -- especially after 30 years of changes in
technology and foreign threats -- and it may not reflect the only way to strike the balance
commanded by the Fourth Amendment -- but it certainly does represent Congress's judgment of
how the balance should be struck, and Congress made that judgment carefully and based on
full information.170
Third, courts should respect legislation, such as FISA, that generally falls within
Congress's powers and is carefully designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights against
executive surveillance.171 By respecting such legislation, courts encourage legislative
enforcement efforts. Those efforts deserve judicial support because they can produce

Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S.
REP. No. 94-755, book III, at 332 (1976) (Church Committee Report)).
167
See S. REP. No. 95-604 at 7 (1977) (observing that hearings on bill enacted as FISA "were the sixth
set of hearings on warrantless wiretapping in as many years").
168
H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at 22 (1978) ("In drafting this bill, the committee has carefully weighed the
need "for foreign intelligence electronic surveillance"] against the privacy and civil liberties interests.").
169
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1238, pt. I, at 13-14 (1978) (describing Justice Department involvement).
170
Cf. Ku, supra note __, at 1360 ("Laws prohibiting certain forms or means of information gathering …
should limit executive power and define at least minimum levels of privacy and security protected by the
Fourth Amendment.").
171
Cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1976) (giving weight to federal statutes authorizing
warrantless felony arrests in determining their reasonableness under Fourth Amendment); AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 290 (1973) ("The Court has been particularly sensitive to the
[Fourth] Amendment's broad standard of 'reasonableness' when … authorizing statutes permitted the
challenged searches."); see also Keith, 407 U.S. at 323-24 (discussing Congress's power to regulate
surveillance for national security); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 250 n.9 (1979) (noting that Title III
"serves a substantial public interest" by giving government surveillance powers while "carefully
prescribing" those powers to protect privacy interests); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (appearing to invite Congress to create remedies
to enforce Fourth Amendment rights to displace court created remedy); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (considering traditionally close supervision of liquor industry,
"Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures" in that
industry); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 605-06 (1946) (detailing history of federal statutes
evidencing Congress's "watchfulness against the dangers of police abuses" in exercise of search and
seizure powers); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928) (stating that, although Fourth
Amendment did not apply to wiretapping involved there, "Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of
telephone messages"); Kerr, supra note __, at 805-06 (arguing that legislatures, rather than courts,
should "provide the primary rules governing law enforcement investigations involving new technologies").
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legislative rules that facilitate judicial enforcement.172 FISA does this, for example, by generally
requiring advance judicial approval for FISA surveillance.173 Some statutes deserve judicial
skepticism because they expand executive power with little attention to individual rights.174
FISA does not fall within that description; it restricted executive power to enforce Fourth
Amendment safeguards.175
Legislative rules enforcing the Fourth Amendment can facilitate judicial enforcement not
only by requiring prior judicial authorization for executive surveillance but also by prescribing
substantive standards for the surveillance. Indeed, FISA prescribes an exhaustively considered
standard for surveillance.176 Legislatively prescribed standards for surveillance can benefit from
the legislature's ability to gather information relevant to balancing government interests in
surveillance against individual privacy interests.177 Furthermore, legislatures may be able to
make clearer standards than those made by courts. Clear rules, in turn, help officials obey the
law and give the public notice of what privacy intrusions are authorized.178 In addition, the
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See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 416-29
(1974) (articulating and defending a rule under which, "[u]nless a search or seizure is conducted pursuant
to and in conformity with either legislation or police departmental rules and regulations, it is an
unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the fourth amendment"); see also Peter P. Swire, Katz Is
Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 930 (2004) (referring to "the catalog of instances where the
Supreme Court worked collaboratively with congress to create surveillance rules"); Kerr, supra note __, at
867-89 (arguing that "legislatures often are better situated than courts to protect privacy in new
technologies"). But cf. Solove, supra note __, at 761 (arguing that legislative rules are not superior to
Fourth Amendment protections articulated by courts).
173
50 U.S.C. §§ 1802 & 1804.
174
See generally Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice:
Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079,
1089 (1993) (arguing that "legislators undervalue the rights of the accused … [because] a far larger
number of persons, of much greater political influence, rationally adopt the perspective of a potential
crime victim rather than the perspective of a suspect or defendant").
175
See Seamon & Gardner, supra note __, at 337 & n.70 (citing legislative history showing executive
branch's awareness that FISA restricted executive power).
176
See id. at 427-435 (discussing legislative history of FISA's surveillance standard).
177
Ku, supra note __, at 1375 (legislatures are "better able to develop a factual record with respect to the
nuances and details of new [surveillance] technologies and their costs and benefits").
178
Cf. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987) (statutory program providing for warrantless
administrative searches "must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the [person
subject to the search] … that the search is being made pursuant to law and has a properly defined scope,
and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers"); Amsterdam, supra note __, at 418 (arguing that
police-made rules would be clearer than judge-made rules); but cf. United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct.
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public may better accept surveillance rules made by their elective representatives than rules
made by unelected federal judges.179 Legislative rules can be revised if they become
unacceptable to the public.180 Legislation can restrict the use of information derived from
surveillance,181 and impose sanctions for violations of those restrictions, including criminal
sanctions.182 In short, courts have good reasons to give significant weight to legislation that
enforces Fourth Amendment limits on surveillance.183
On the flip side, allowing the President to ignore statutory restrictions on surveillance
encourages executive lawlessness. Courts should discourage that behavior by preferring
Fourth Amendment interpretations that encourage the executive branch to collaborate with the
legislature to frame such rules, rather than defying them. After all, how is the public to feel
when an Act of Congress supposedly provides the "exclusive" authority for a specified type of
surveillance yet they learn that a program exists "outside" that authority and has been going on
for years?184 Such a situation is likely to undermine public confidence that the nation's leaders

1494, 1501 (2006) (rejecting the argument that victim of search is entitled to a copy of warrant before
search begins in order to ensure searching officers stay within scope of warrant).
179
NSA III: Wartime Executive Powers and the FISA Court: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. On the
th
Judiciary, 109 Cong. ___ (Mar. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Senate Hearing of Mar. 28, 2006] (testimony of
Morton Halperin, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress) (notice to U.S. citizens of "the rules under
which they may be subject to surveillance by their government in the name of national security" are
necessary "to secure the necessary support of the American people for the appropriate steps needed to
reduce the risk of terrorist attacks"), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1825&wit_id=5189.
180
See Senate Hearing of Mar. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (prepared statement of Morton Halperin,
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, and Exec. Director, Open Society Policy center) (notice to
public of rules for surveillance is necessary so that, if the public "believe[s] the law requires
reconsideration, they can seek change by lobbying the president and the Congress and by exercising
their right to vote").
181
See 50 U.S.C. § 1806 (regulating the use of information obtained in FISA surveillance); see also
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (dissemination to third parties of results of
government-conducted drug tests caused drug testing program for pregnant women to involve a "far more
substantial" invasion of privacy than prior cases in which dissemination of drug test results was more
restricted).
182
See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (FISA provision prescribing criminal penalties); cf. Amsterdam, supra note
__, at 428-29 (arguing that police-made rules could include administrative sanctions).
183
Cf. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.").
184
See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. At least before FISA, Title III notified the public notice
that the President might have power to conduct surveillance outside statutory constraints. See supra

46
obey the rule of law. It undermines faith in the legislative branch's willingness and ability to
check executive abuse and in the President's willingness to abide by legislative restrictions.
To implement respect for legislation, such as FISA, that is carefully designed to enforce
the Fourth Amendment, courts should presume treat surveillance "outside FISA" violates the
Fourth Amendment. After all, FISA reflects Congress's judgment, formed with extensive input
from the executive branch, of what the Fourth Amendment requires. Treating FISA violations as
presumptive Fourth Amendment violations simply reflects that, when surveillance violates a
statute that Congress and the Executive Branch designed to enforce the Fourth Amendment,
the surveillance is likely to violate the Fourth Amendment. Thus, this presumption of
unconstitutionality works like the presumption that the warrantless search of a home violates the
Fourth Amendment.185 The latter presumption reflects that warrantless searches of homes are
likely to violate the Fourth Amendment.186 In addition to this probabilistic basis for the
presumption against warrantless searches of home, that presumption encourages police to
obtain warrants, just as the presumptive unconstitutionality of surveillance outside FISA
encourages compliance with FISA.187 In short, both presumptions are rooted in common sense
and further the Fourth Amendment's function of preventing abuses of power.
Of course, the presumptive unconstitutionality of surveillance outside FISA may be
overcome. First and foremost, the presumption is overcome by proof that the surveillance was

note __ (describing provision in Title III disclaiming that it limited President's power to protect national
security).
185
See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004) (stating the presumption against constitutionality of
warrantless searches of the home).
186
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("With few exceptions, the question whether a
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.").
187
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (warrant preference discourages police from acting
without warrant). In contrast to the presumption of unconstitutionality that I am arguing should attend
surveillance outside FISA, the Fifth Circuit has held, in the context of a search by Customs officials, that a
"warrantless seizure or search in the complete absence of authority -- a lawless governmental intrusion -th
is unconstitutional per se." United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1074 (5 Cir. 1980) (en banc). The
D.C. Circuit has criticized that holding. See United States v. Gonzalez, 875 F.2d 875, 877-78 (D.C. Cir.
1989); see also Barwood v. District of Columbia, 202 F.3d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument
that arrests under ultra vires state law would automatically violate Fourth Amendment).

47
justified by a genuine national security emergency.188 Furthermore, FISA has some
requirements that are not related to enforcing the Fourth Amendment.189 The government
should be able to show that surveillance that violates FISA nonetheless satisfies the Fourth
Amendment because the violation is only technical or insubstantial. If the government cannot
make this showing, however, the courts should find surveillance outside FISA to be also outside
the Fourth Amendment. By presuming the unconstitutionality of surveillance outside FISA,
courts can defang the current NSA surveillance program by limiting surveillance largely to
instances in which it is reasonably necessary to respond to genuine national security
emergencies.190
IV.

Conclusion
Surveillance outside FISA presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment, except when

the surveillance is justified by genuine national security emergency. Surveillance outside FISA
that is justified by a genuine emergency not only satisfies the Fourth Amendment but also falls
within the President's power even though the surveillance violates FISA. That is because FISA
violates the separation of powers doctrine to the extent that FISA tries to forbids the President
from taking measures that he or she reasonably believes necessary to respond to genuine
188

See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. The government might also rely on exigencies not
directly related to a national security emergency or on Fourth Amendment doctrines, besides the exigent
circumstances doctrine, that allow warrantless searches. As a practical matter, however, these
alternatives are not likely to arise often. Furthermore, as discussed above, neither the special needs
doctrine nor the border search doctrine supports the NSA surveillance program as a whole. See supra
note __.
189
For example, FISA prescribes the contents of court orders authorizing surveillance. 50 U.S.C. §
1805(c). The prescribed contents include a judicial direction that officials "compensate, at the prevailing
rate," anyone who helps officials accomplish the surveillance -- including the landlord who uses her
passkey to open the apartment in which a telephone tap is to be placed. Id. § 1805(c)(2)(D). A
surveillance order that omits this direction technically violates FISA, as does a surveillance operation in
which a landlord assists without receiving compensation. Yet neither of these technical violations should
lead to a conclusion that the surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment.
190
As noted above, supra note __, courts can presumably review surveillance under the NSA program
when the government seeks to use evidence derived from such surveillance in criminal prosecutions. Cf.
United State v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2005) (reviewing district court's ruling on
defendant's motion to suppress evidence derived from FISA surveillance). Judicial review may also be
available in civil litigation challenging the program, though this remains to be determined. See Niraj
Warikoo, Wiretap Suit All About Power, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 13, 2006, at __ (reporting on hearing
in ACLU v. NSA, supra note __, in which government argues for dismissal).
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national security emergencies. The current NSA surveillance program also violates the
Constitution, however, because it exceeds the President's congressionally irreducible power to
respond to genuine national security emergencies.
As this summary show, the current situation involves unconstitutional conduct by the
President (in authorizing NSA surveillance that is not justified by a genuine national security
emergency) and by Congress (in enacting a statute, FISA, that in some instances infringes on
the President's plenary powers under the Constitution). Beyond violating the Constitution, the
President and Congress have created great legal uncertainty: Congress says one thing in FISA,
the President is doing another in the NSA program. Thus, the surveillance law on the books
differs from the surveillance law "on the streets." This is no way to fight a war on terrorism.
Most supporters and opponents of the NSA program now appear to agree on the need
to make the surveillance law on the books congruent with the surveillance law on the streets. A
similar consensus produced FISA.191 As with FISA, new legislation will be contentious and take
time. As with FISA, the contentiousness surrounding new legislation stems from the need to
strike two difficult balances: (1) the balance between national security and "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches, and seizures"192; and (2) the balance between the President's power and Congress's
power to strike that first balance. Even rancorous and protracted debate on those issues is
better than the current situation.
This article seeks to contribute to the debate in two ways. First, it sheds light on a
connection that has not received enough attention: the connection between the President's
power to defy an Act of Congress and Fourth Amendment limits on that power. Second, in
exploring that connection, the article offers an analysis that is more nuanced, and stakes out a
more moderate position, than those offered by most opponents and supporters of the current
191

See Seamon & Gardner, supra note __, at 336-37 & nn. 66-71 (2005) (discussing and citing relevant
legislative history).
192
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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NSA program. The separation of powers analysis offered here neither denies the existence of
congressionally irreducible power in the President nor supports the President's disregard of
generally valid legislation. Similarly, the Fourth Amendment analysis offered here recognizes
Congress's authority to enforce the Fourth Amendment without treating that authority as
absolutely binding on the executive branch or the courts. It is hoped that principled legal
analysis will facilitate principled and politically feasible proposals for legislative reform.

